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ASIAN AMERICAN VOTING RIGHTS AND
REPRESENTATION: A PERSPECTIVE
FROM THE NORTHEAST
Glenn D. Magpantay*
INTRODUCTION
Asian Americans1 are one of the fastest-growing minority groups
in the nation,2 estimated to number more than eleven million peo-
ple.3 Of the ten states with the largest number of Asian Ameri-
cans, three are in the Northeast:4 New York has the nation's
second largest Asian American population,5 New Jersey the fifth
largest,6 and Massachusetts the tenth.7 Yet despite the commu-
nity's growth, size, and concentration, Asian Americans in the
Northeast routinely have been overlooked by elected officials at
nearly all levels of government.
In these three states, no Asian American has ever been elected
to any state legislative or congressional seat. New York City has a
population of more than 800,000 Asian Americans, and has never
* Democracy Project Director and former National Association for Public Inter-
est Law (NAPIL) Equal Justice Fellow at the Asian American Legal Defense and
Education Fund (AALDEF), New York, New York. I wish to thank Margaret Fung,
AALDEF Executive Director, for her help in developing this piece and for years of
dedication to advancing the interests of Asian Americans. I also would like to thank
my partner, Christopher S. Goeken.
1. By "Asian American," I mean all residents of the United States with ethnic
lineage to nations in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia.
2. Hispanic and Asian Populations Expand, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2000, at A16.
3. POPULATION DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION ESTI-
MATES OF THE UNITED STATES BY SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: APRIL 1, 1990
TO JULY 1, 1999, WITH SHORT-TERM PROJECTION TO NOVEMBER 1, 2000 (Aug. 25,
2000), http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/intfile3-l.txt.
4. The declining order is: (1) California, (2) New York, (3) Hawaii, (4) Texas, (5)
New Jersey, (6) Illinois, (7) Washington, (8) Florida, (9) Virginia, (10) Massachusetts.
POPULATION DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR STATES
BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: JULY 1, 1990 (Aug. 30, 2000), http://www.census.gov/
population/estimates/state/srh/srh99.txt.
5. Id. (indicating that New York has just over one million Asian Americans).
6. Id. (indicating that New Jersey has about 470,000 Asian Americans). This is a
significant increase. In 1990, New Jersey was only ranked sixth largest. POPULATION
DIVISION, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION OF STATES BY RACE & HIS-
PANIC ORIGIN: APRIL 1, 1990 (Aug. 30, 2000), http://www.census.gov/population/esti-
mates/state/srh/srhmars.txt.
7. Supra note 4 (indicating that Massachusetts has just over 233,000 Asian
Americans).
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elected an Asian American to the City Council. Representatives of
Asian neighborhoods, like Flushing, Queens or Chinatown, Man-
hattan, have at times disregarded the needs of the community and
even held residents in disdain.8 An Asian American voting rights
strategy can guard against Asian Americans being considered out-
siders in the American political process while simultaneously en-
hancing the political incorporation of Asian Americans.
This article will present a strategy for advancing Asian American
voting rights and for ensuring that Asian Americans have a full and
fair opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice, as guaranteed
by the Voting Rights Act,9 through an exploration of legal issues in
the census, redistricting, and alternative voting systems. First, it
will discuss the importance of an accurate count of Asian Ameri-
cans in the decennial census. Second, it will explore legal strategies
to achieve the meaningful representation' of Asian Americans
through the redrawing of federal, state, and local voting district
boundaries. Third, it will review the merits and limitations of alter-
native voting systems. This article will illustrate challenges and so-
lutions in Asian American voting rights using examples in the
Northeast." The overarching goal of this article is to provide a
strategy to encourage more inclusive, and thus responsive, govern-
ment, and to promote fairness and democracy in the electoral
process.
8. E.g., Celia W. Dugger, Queens Old-Timers Uneasy As Asian Influence Grows,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996, at Al (quoting Councilwoman Julia Harrison, who repre-
sents Flushing, as describing Asian immigrants as "colonizers," and their arrival more
like "an invasion, not an assimilation," and mistakenly describing Bok Choy (Chinese
broccoli) as dandelion). Assembly member Sheldon Silver, the powerful Speaker of
the State Assembly, represents Chinatown, but some local residents contend that he
has done very little to advance the needs and interests of the community, and has
delivered merely resources to the community. See, e.g., Adam Miller, Shelly's Com-
munity Sees No Silver Lining, N.Y. POST, May 19, 1999, at 5 (labeling Sheldon as "sell
out" to his core constituents).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b) (1994).
10. Meaningful representation envisions representation in local, state, and na-
tional legislatures that can lead to tangible benefits for the Asian American commu-
nity. See Brief for the Congressional Black Caucus as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellants at 12, United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) (No. 94-558), reprinted in
A. Leon Higginbotham, United States v. Hays: Brief for the Congressional Black Cau-
cus as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, 38 HOWARD L.J. 665, 678 (1995) (dis-
cussing the importance of representation). Mechanically, meaningful representation
could include the election of a representative of the same race or cultural heritage as
the historically disenfranchised community that she represents, a representative
electorally preferred by the historically disenfranchised community, or even one who
represents and tries to advance the interests of the historically disenfranchised
community.
11. The examples herein will focus on New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts.
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I. ACCURATE COUNT OF ASIAN AMERICANS IN CENSUS 2000
A. Asian Americans and the Census
An accurate census should be the cornerstone of any strategy for
political empowerment of Asian Americans. Every ten years, the
federal government attempts to count the entire population of the
nation through the decennial census. 12 The census is used as a ba-
sis to determine, plan, and allocate a plethora of state and federal
benefits for communities. The census reveals demographic profiles
of communities: the number of youth, disabled, poor, non-English
speakers, racial and ethnic minorities, total population, etc. Census
data are then used in funding formulas to allocate resources for the
building of schools, hospitals, and playgrounds, teacher hiring, and
services for immigrants, youth, and the elderly.13 Census data, by
evidencing the numbers of racial and ethnic minorities, also are
used to enforce an array of civil rights laws in employment, hous-
ing, lending, education, voting rights,' 4 and especially to determine
the availability of bilingual ballots and voting materials. a5 Politi-
cally, census data are used to apportion the 435 congressional seats
among the fifty states,16 and to redraw the boundaries of municipal,
state, and congressional districts.1 7 With so much at stake, it is im-
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; 13 U.S.C. § 141 (1994).
13. E.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FORMULA GRANTS: EFFECTS OF AD-
JUSTED POPULATION COUNTS ON FEDERAL FUNDING TO STATES' (Feb. 1999); THE
U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE FISCAL IMPACT OF THE CENSUS UNDERCOUNT
ON CITIES A 34-CiTr SURVEY (Jan. 1999), http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/
wash-update/census/census executive.htm; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, EFFECT OF
CENSUS 2000 UNDERCOUNT ON FEDERAL FUNDING TO STATE AND LOCAL AREAS,
2002-2012 (Mar. 9, 2000) (prepared for U.S. Census Monitoring Board), available at
http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/ncpressrelease.nsf/DocID/
43C93C94F37E3A848525689D007430FF.
14. LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUCATION FUND, CENSUS 2000 EVERYONE
COUNTS 1.1 (1999), portions available at http://209.207.129.4/crlibrary/issues/census/
1.1.html [hereinafter LCED, CENSUS 2000].
15. See Language Assistance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994); Implementation of the Provisions of the Voting Rights
Act Regarding Language Minority Groups, 28 C.F.R. § 55 (2000).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a, 2b (1994).
17. See 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportion-
ment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1998) (identifying the political
difficulties in performing and policing the reapportionment); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, BRIEFING ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECENT SUPREME
COURT DECISION ON SAMPLING AND THE CENSUS BEFORE THE U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, (Feb. 12, 1999) (Statement of Edward Still, Director, Voting Rights
Project, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law), at http://
www.connectlive.com/events/civilrightscommission/sampling02l299.html.
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perative that all people of color, especially Asian Americans, are
counted accurately in the census.' 8
Despite the importance of an accurate count, 4.4 people million
were double-counted in the 1990 census and 8.4 million people
were missed completely, yielding a net undercount of four mil-
lion. 19 The undercounted and overcounted populations were ra-
cially and geographically disparate.2 ° The undercount almost
invariably occurred in urban areas, among people of color, immi-
grants, non-English speakers, and the poor.2 ' The overcount oc-
curred in suburban areas, among largely white, economically
affluent communities. 2
2
Asian Americans particularly were impacted by the census un-
dercount. Nationally, Asian Americans were missed in the census
three times as often as whites.23 In the Northeast, the Asian Amer-
ican undercount was even more severe.24 In New York, 3.2% of
Asian Americans residents were not counted by the census.25 In
18. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BRIEFING ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS IMPLICA-
TIONS OF THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION ON SAMPLING AND THE CENSUS
BEFORE THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, (Feb. 12, 1999) (Statement of
Karen K. Narasaki, Executive Director, National Asian Pacific American Legal Con-
sortium), at http://www.connectlive.com/events/civilrightscommission/sampling
021299.html. Certainly, all people must be counted in the census. However, people of
color traditionally have been missed in the census.
19. LCED, CENSUS 2000, supra note 14, at 20.1 (citing the U.S. General Account-
ing Office).
20. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO CON-
GRESS-THE PLAN FOR CENSUS 2000, at 5-6 (1997), available at http://www.uscensus
2000.com/main/plans/plan2000.pdf [hereinafter THE PLAN FOR CENSUS 2000]; LCED,
CENSUS 2000, supra note 14, at 12.1.
21. THE PLAN FOR CENSUS 2000, supra note 20, at 4-6 (indicating that some rea-
sons for the undercount included language barriers, fear of governmental employees,
disbelief in the confidentiality of census information, and non-legal living arrange-
ments. Also, the presence of additional family members or multiple families in
crowded apartments often violates private leases and local housing codes).
22. See id. Some reasons for the overcount were dual home ownership and chil-
dren attending boarding schools or non-local colleges. Id.; LCED, CENSUS 2000, supra
note 14, at 4.1.
23. LCED, CENSUS 2000, supra note 14, at 6.1, 20.1. Specifically, 2.3% of Asian
Americans, 4.4% of African Americans, 12.2% of Native Americans living on reser-
vations, and 5% of Latinos were missed in the final census count. This stands in stark
contrast to the 0.7% undercount rate of the white population. Id. at 1.2.
24. In the Northeast, the undercount rates of Asian Americans were generally
higher than 3%; in the West Coast states, the undercount rate of Asian Americans
generally hovered around 2%. Id. at 20.3; see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra
note 13, app. A-14. In California the rate was 2.1%, Oregon 2.9%, Washington 2.1%,
and Hawaii 1.2%. LCED, CENSUS 2000, supra note 14, at 20.3; see PRICE-
WATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13, app. A-14.
25. LCED, CENSUS 2000, supra note 14, at 20.3; see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
supra note 13, app. A-14.
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Massachusetts, the undercount rate was 3.9%-the highest per-
centage of all the Northeastern states. 26 The undercount was often
even more striking on the local level. In Jersey City, New Jersey,
which has a large Filipino and South Asian population, the local
undercount rate was 3.5%-six times the state undercount rate.27
Although Asian Americans are one of the fastest growing minority
groups in the Northeast,28 census undercounts result in the Asian
American community losing federal funding,29 state resources,3 °
and political representation.3'
The census undercount jeopardizes the political representation
of people of color in New York.32 Three of the nation's most un-
dercounted congressional districts are in New York,33 and all of
26. LCED, CENSUS 2000, supra note 14, at 20.3; see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
supra note 13, app. A-14.
27. LCED, CENSUS 2000, supra note 14, New Jersey app. The state undercount
rate was 0.6% for all persons and 1.7% for Asian Americans. Id. at 20.3; see PRICE-
WATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13, app. A-14.
28. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WE THE AMER-
ICANS: ASIAN 1-2 (1993), available at, http://www.census.gov/apsd/wepeople/we-3.pdf.
29. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FORMULA GRANTS: EFFECTS OF
ADJUSTED POPULATION COUNTS ON FEDERAL FUNDING TO STATES (1999); THE U.S.
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 13; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note
13.
30. For instance, the estimated impact of the 1990 census undercount in New York
City was a loss in funding that would have supplied ninety-nine schools and 4380
teachers. In Jersey City alone, funds lost through the undercount would have sup-
ported five schools and two hundred teachers. Many of these lost education funds
would have flowed to minority neighborhoods. See Press Release, Children's Def.
Fund, Two Million Missing Children: Children's Defense Fund Calculates Un-
dercount of Children in 188 Cities If Census Bureau Cannot Use Recommend Scien-
tific Methods (Sept. 8, 1998) (accompanying attachment, Children Missed by the 1990
Census in 191 Cities), available at http://www.childrensdefense.org/release000322.
html; see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 13 (finding that in the 2002-
2012 period, 169 metropolitan areas are expected to lose $11.1 billion in federal funds
as a result of the 2000 census undercount and that the undercount rate for certain
minority groups exceeds five percent).
31. See MARK GERSH & KEN STRAMA, NAT'L COMM. FOR AN EFFECTIVE CONG.,
1990 CENSUS UNDERCOUNT BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT (1998), available at http://
www.ncec.org/under.pdf [hereinafter GERSH & STRAMA, UNDERCOUNT 3Y CONGRES-
SIONAL DISTRICT]; Steven A. Holmes, New York Hardest Hit by Census Flaws, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 1998, at B6.
32. PRESIDENTIAL MEMBERS, U.S. CENSUS MONITORING BD., IMPLICATIONS FOR
MINORITY VOTERS IN 2001: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE 1990 CENSUS 11-13 (2001) (re-
viewing the effect of the undercount on state legislative districts).
33. GERSH & STRAMA, UNDERCOUNT BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, supra note
31. The three congressional districts were in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx. See
Steven A. Holmes, New York Hardest Hit by Census Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
1998, at B6. Half of the nation's twelve most undercounted congressional districts
were in New York, the other half were in California. GERSH & STRAMA, UN-
DERCOUNT BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, supra note 31.
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these are majority-minority districts represented by African Amer-
icans or Latinos.34 New York's 12th Congressional District was
ranked as the tenth most undercounted congressional district in the
nation. More than 27,000 12th District residents were not ac-
counted for by the census. 35 Because all representatives must re-
present approximately the same number of people, the
representation of the residents in this district was diluted. Moreo-
ver, this undercounted district contains large Asian American com-
munities in the Chinatown, Manhattan and Sunset Park, Brooklyn
neighborhoods. By contrast, the most overcounted district was in
Long Island, New York, an affluent, suburban, white community. 36
The overcount added an estimated 7500 non-existent residents to
the district's total population.37 To ensure the fair allocation of po-
litical representation, the undercount and overcount must be
mitigated.
B. Adjusting the Census for Accuracy
The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund
("AALDEF") and other civil rights groups were actively involved
in campaigns to ensure an accurate census count. One effort has
been to lobby the U.S. Census Bureau to adjust and correct popu-
lation figures derived from headcounts, by using advanced scien-
tific techniques such as statistical sampling.38
Several indicators predict thousands of Asian Americans again
will be missed in the census if only a physical headcount is taken.39
The Census Dress Rehearsal in 1998, a special census count of a
sample population, revealed that Asian Americans were un-
dercounted at a rate of six percent.4 ° In the execution of Census
2000, a multitude of problems were reported, especially in counting
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See Steven A. Holmes, New York Hardest Hit by Census Flaws, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 1998, at B6. The district is in Nassau County. Id.
37. Id.
38. See infra, notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
39. A physical headcount is taken two ways. First, individuals complete and return
questionnaire forms which the Census Bureau mails out to every household in the
United States. Second, census-takers, who are dispatched to all households that do
not return a form, take the information of an individual through a personal interview.
40. See Press Release, Econ. & Statistics Admin., Bureau of the Census, Racial,
Ethnic Undercounts Detailed For Census 2000 Dress Rehearsal Sites by Census Bu-
reau (Feb. 24, 1999), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/1999/
cn99-09.html.
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people of color, immigrants, and language minorities.41 In New
York, for example, AALDEF found that immigrants had to speak
English to find a Census Assistance Center to get help in filling out
the census form in their native language. 42 At one point, AAL-
DEF also observed that census-takers canvassing Manhattan's Chi-
natown did not speak Chinese.43 Undoubtedly, Asian Americans
were not completely counted in Census 2000. Taking the extra step
of employing statistical sampling would adjust the final figures to
make the census more reflective of the true population.44
Sampling estimates the number of individuals missed or double
counted in the census.45 It would begin with individuals who were
affirmatively counted in the census.46 Then another survey, asking
the same questions as the census form, would be taken of a smaller,
representative random sample of the population. The variance
would be demographically correlated to identify and measure any
undercount or overcount.
The use of sampling in the census was originally recommended
in the early 1990s by the National Academy of Sciences. The
Academy was commissioned by the Republican administration of
President George H.W. Bush to develop cost-effective and more
accurate methods to correct for the differential undercount and
overcount in the census.47 Sampling was originally proposed as a
41. See generally Maki Becker, Asians Watching Census, Legal Defense Fund Wary
of Undercount, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), July 6, 2000, at QLI1; Alvord, Asian Are Eager
to Be Counted in California, Census Finds Community Harder to Reach in N.Y., USA
TODAY, Apr. 19, 2000, at 16A; Mae M. Cheng, Down for the Count, Low Response to
Census in Queens' Minority Communities, NEWSDAY, Apr. 7, 2000, at A7; Steven Lee
Myers, Census Letters Go to 120 Million Wrong Addresses, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2000,
at A15; David Stout, Census Takers Uneasy as Mail Response Lags, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
5, 2000, at A16. GLENN D. MAGPANTAY & PHILIP M. LIU, ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. &
EDUC. FUND, COUNTING ASIAN AMERICANS: AN EVALUATION OF CENSUS 2000 PRO-
GRAMS AND POLICIES (2001);
42. Glenn D. Magpantay, Flawed Census Figures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001. See
generally MAGPANTAY & LIU, supra note 41.
43. Magpantay, Flawed Census Figures, supra note 42.
44. See Press Release, Econ & Statistics Admin., Bureau of the Census, Racial,
Ethnic Undercounts Detailed For Census 2000 Dress Rehearsal Sites by Census Bureau
(Feb. 24, 1999), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/1999/cn99-
09.html.
45. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MODERNIZING THE U.S. CENSUS 30-31
(Barry Edmonston & Charles Schultze eds., 1995); THE PLAN FOR CENSUS 2000,
supra note 20, at 7.
46. See note 39 for counting methods used in the census.
47. Decennial Census Improvement Act of 1991, 13 U.S.C. § 141 (1994); NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE 2000 CENSUS: INTERIM REPORT II, at 1
(Andrew A. White & Keith F. Rust eds., 1997), available at http://www.nap.edu/
books/0309058805/html/index.htmI; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MODERNIZING THE
2001]
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mechanism to count the last remaining groups within the popula-
tion-those that are the most resistant to being counted.4 8 Sam-
pling was proposed merely to supplement, not replace a headcount.
Sampling has been hailed as a scientifically accepted and more cost
effective way to ensure an accurate count of the population.49 Yet,
erroneously, many journalists thought, and some politicians propa-
gandized, that sampling would completely replace a headcount.5"
Conservative activists and Republican lawmakers, fearing an ac-
curate count of individuals whom they suspected tended to vote
more Democratic-urban dwellers, people of color, and the
poor-challenged the use of sampling in the courts.51 In two U.S.
Supreme Court cases, Department of Commerce v. United States
House of Representatives,52 and its companion case, Glavin v. Clin-
ton,53 the plaintiffs argued that the Constitution intended the cen-
sus to be conducted exclusively by a headcount of the population,54
and therefore that the use of statistical sampling was impermissi-
ble. The Census Bureau argued that although it still planned to
use a headcount in Census 2000, modern and accepted scientific
techniques, such as statistical sampling, needed to be employed be-
cause of the impracticability and impossibility of literally counting
everyone.56 Organizations of Asian Americans and other people
U.S. CENSUS (Barry Edmonston & Charles Schultze eds., 1995); THE PLAN FOR CEN-
sus 2000, supra note 20, at 7.
48. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2000, at
9-12 (1999) [hereinafter NCSL, REDISTRICTING LAW]. Originally the Census Bureau
planned to take a headcount of 90% of the population and estimate the remaining
10%. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 324-25
(1999). That remaining 10% is comprised of the most fearful and unwilling individuals
to participate in the census. The cost of counting that remaining 10% is astronomical
in comparison to counting the first 90%. THE PLAN FOR CENSUS 2000, supra note 20,
at 5-6. Whereas the original budget for the census was $2.78 billion to count 90% of
the population, an additional $1.72 billion was needed to count the remaining 10%.
Census 2000 Initiative, Administration Spells Out Need for Extra Census Funds As
Senate Appropriators Meet to Consider Fiscal Year 2000 Request, NEws ALERT
ARCHIVE, June 10, 1999, available at http://www.census2000.org/news/99/61099.html.
49. Lynne Billard, Sampling and the Census 2000, Address Before the National
Press Club and Congressional Members and Staffers (July 1998, Washington, D.C.), in
ASA, STATS #25, Spring 1999, at 6.
50. Victoria Rifkin, Lawyers Hope Community Work on Census Adds Up, N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 6, 2000, at 1.
51. James Dao, Census Ruling Reignites a Partisan Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
1999, at A17.
52. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
53. Glavin v. Clinton, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
54. Id. at 327-28 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; 13 U.S.C. § 141(a)-(b) (1994)).
55. Glavin v. Clinton, 525 U.S. 316, 327-28 (1999).
56. Id. at 323-27.
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of color intervened as parties in both lawstits to defend the Bu-
reau's plans to use statistical sampling.5 7 In 1999, the U.S. Su-
preme Court partially decided the legitimacy of using sampling in
the census. The Court ruled that, under its reading of the Census
Act,58 sampling could not be used to develop census data appor-
tioning congressional seats among the states.59 However, the
Court did not expressly bar the use of sampling in the development
of census data that would be used for other purposes,6 ° which could
include redistricting, distribution of federal funds, allocation of
state benefits and resources, and other statistical purposes.6'
Consonant with the Court ruling, the Census Bureau moved for-
ward with a plan that counts the entire population by a headcount,
but will produce two census numbers, one "raw" and one "ad-
justed" using some sampling techniques.62 The raw data will be
derived exclusively from an effort to count everyone via a strict
enumeration. The adjusted data will consist of the strict headcount
figures that have been corrected for any inadvertent undercount
and overcount-essentially employing sampling as a quality-check
device. On December 28, 2000, the raw total population figure of
each state was delivered to the president, allowing the apportion-
ment of congressional seats among the states to commence.63 By
April 1, 2001, the Bureau will deliver both the raw and adjusted
localized data to states in order to redraw voting district bounda-
ries.64 Although the raw figures also will be released,65 under the
57. Brief for Appellees National Korean American Service & Education Consor-
tium, Inc., et al. in Support of Appellants, Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999) (No. 98-404).
58. Decennial Census Improvement Act of 1991, 13 U.S.C. § 141 (1994).
59. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 334
(1999).
60. Id.
61. Dao, supra note 51; Editorial, Taking the Census Two Ways, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
27, 1999, at A24.
62. Dr. Kenneth Prewitt, U.S. Census Bureau Director, Statement at the National
Press Club, (Feb. 24, 1999), at http://www.census.gov/pubinfo/www/talkpoint.html;
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS 2000, UPDATES SUM-
MARY: CENSUS 2000 OPERATIONAL PLAN 13 (1999), available at http://
www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/2000plan.pdf; Editorial, supra note 61.
63. Press Release, Econ. & Statistics Admin., U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000
Shows Resident Population of 281,421,906; Apportionment Counts Delivered to Pres-
ident (Dec. 28, 2001), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2000/cbOOcn64.html.
Delivery is mandated per U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994); 13 U.S.C.
§ 141(a)-(b) (1994).
64. 13 U.S.C. § 141 (c) (1994).
65. The figures will be released pursuant to a budget compromise reached be-
tween President Clinton and congressional leaders over funding for the Census Bu-
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current plan, the adjusted figures are to be designated as the redis-
tricting data.66 Barring any change,67 this plan raises two issues
concerning the constitutional imperative of "one person, one
vote, 68 which might complicate the redrawing of voting districts.69
1. Congressional District Populations
The first issue is whether using raw census figures in apportion-
ing congressional seats among the states will violate the doctrine of
"one person, one vote." Under Article I, all congressional districts
within a state must be as nearly equal in population as is "practica-
reau. The budget included funds for a modest statistical sampling operation in order
to adjust the raw census figures. Id.
66. This set of data is commonly referred to as the "PL 94-171" file. See 13 U.S.C.
§ 141(c) (1994).
67. Early in his presidential campaign, George W. Bush expressed that only a
headcount should be used for the census. Since then, he has been silent on the issue.
John Mercurio, Bush May Face Census Battle Clinton Could Quietly Leave Stamp On
Redistricting, ROLL CALL, Dec. 7, 2000; Sherry Sylvester, Texas Governor Urges
Traditional Headcount, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 23, 2000, at 6A.
68. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). For congressional districts, the doc-
trine of "one person, one vote" emanates from the Article I of the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 549 (1962). For state and local dis-
tricts, it emanates from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
69. Steven A. Holmes, The Big Census Issue: Using Sampling in Redistricting, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2000, § 1, at 24. Another issue that will complicate redistricting is the
effect of counting and tabulating multiple-race respondents in the census. OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, GUIDANCE ON AGGREGATION AND ALLOCATION OF DATA ON
RACE FOR USE IN CIVIL RIGHTS MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT, OMB BULLETIN
No. 00-02 (Mar. 2000), available at http://docs.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins/bOO-
02.html; NCSL, REDISTRICTING LAW, supra note 48, at 13; D'Vera Cohn, Census Will
Vary Race Counting, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2000, at A4; Steven A. Holmes, The Polit-
ics of Race And the Census, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2000, § 4, at 3; Diana Jean Schemo,
Despite Options on Census, Many to Check 'Black' Only, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2000, at
Al (describing community education efforts).
The census allowed individuals the option of selecting more than one racial/ethnic
classification on the census questionnaire form to identify themselves. OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, GUIDANCE ON AGGREGATION AND ALLOCATION OF DATA ON
RACE FOR USE IN CIVIL RIGHTS MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT, supra. This self
selection can yield up to sixty-three possible racial and ethnic combinations. Not only
will this dramatically complicate the redrawing of voting districts, but it also could
jeopardize the enforcement of voting rights laws. The problem is rooted in the meth-
odology of counting multiple race responses. The numbers of people of color can go
up or down, depending on how the responses are counted. For example, a half-white,
half-Asian person, can be counted as half-white, half-Asian, white, or Asian. Tabula-
tion can only be done with whole numbers, because the total cannot result in a frac-
tion, and bi-racial individuals cannot be counted twice. Computers of the twenty-first
century are simply not advanced enough to tabulate persons who are 0.5, 0.25, and
down to 0.7 of each racial category for 281 million people. This issue must be explored
further, but it is outside the scope of this article.
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ble. ' 70 In addition, each person's vote is entitled to the same
weight as that of every other voter.71 But in the raw figures, each
state will have a different percentage of people under- and over-
counted.72 By using these raw numbers for apportionment, base
populations of congressional districts will vary greatly, state by
state.73
The apportionment of the total 435 congressional seats is carried
out according to a series of simple mathematical formulas. 74 First,
each state is allocated one representative. Then the total popula-
tion of the United States is divided by the remaining number of
congressional seats left to allocate, 385. 75 An additional number of
seats, if any, are allotted to each state based on the state's popula-
tion.76 These calculations use raw census figures.77 The base, or
"ideal," population for each congressional district within a state is
then determined by dividing the total state population by the num-
ber of districts. 78 However, because each state experiences differ-
ing numbers of people missed, the actual ideal population of
congressional districts, determined by adjusted figures, differs
greatly by state.79
For example, the average population nationally for congressional
districts will be about 650,000 this decade.8 ° One state with a low
undercount rate could find that the ideal population for each con-
gressional district is 500,000 people, whereas another state with a
particularly high undercount rate could set the population per dis-
trict at 800,000. As a result, representatives from different states
will have districts containing different numbers of constituents.
70. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
71. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
72. For example, in 1990, 834,516 people in California were not counted in the raw
figures, whereas only 1347 were not counted in Rhode Island. LCED, CENSUS 2000,
supra note 14, at 20.1.
73. See NCSL, REDISTRICTING LAW, supra note 48, at 21.
74. 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a, 2b (1994 & Supp. V 1998).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999);
Glavin v. Clinton, 19 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Va. 1998).
78. NCSL, REDISTRICTING LAW, supra note 48, at 21.
79. This variance is not new. In 1992, of states with more than one congressional
seat, the smallest congressional districts were in Rhode Island with 501,732 residents,
and the largest districts were in Kansas with 619,370. Id. at 45-46. Using unadjusted
census figures greatly magnifies the differences.
80. Press Release, Econ. & Statistics Admin., Bureau of the Census, Census 2000
Shows Resident Population of 281,421,906; Apportionment Counts Delivered to Pres-
ident (Dec. 28, 2000), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2000/
cbOOcn64.html.
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Certainly this violates the equal population principle,8' however
the principle has never been applied among the states.8 2 The princi-
ple has been applied only to deviations in population among con-
gressional districts within a state.83
A natural and logical extension of the constitutional principle of
"one person, one vote" is to apply it across state boundaries. The
Court has held that one person's vote here must weigh as much as
another's vote there.84 Whether "here" and "there" refer to differ-
ent parts of a state or different parts of the nation should be irrele-
vant. A constitutional imperative should not yield to formalistic
state boundary lines. Following Census 2000, when it is discovered
that certain states may have received fewer congressional seats
than an accurate census would have entitled them to have, the
Court will have occasion to enforce this doctrine. 5
2. Intrastate Redistricting
On April 1, 2001, the Census Bureau will deliver the adjusted
data to the states for redrawing the boundaries of congressional,
state legislative, and city councilmanic districts.86 But the Bureau
will also deliver the raw data. The second issue raised when the
census produces two sets of data is whether states permissibly may
opt to use raw and, admittedly, inaccurate census data for redis-
tricting, notwithstanding the fact that the Bureau has designated
the corrected numbers for redistricting.87 Redistricting is com-
81. While some variance from the national average is tolerable, deviations that
flow from using raw census figures will be much greater in magnitude, and thereby
have a significant impact on representation. Infra note 94.
82. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
83. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783
(1973); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727-28, 732, 741 (1983).
84. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
85. New York will be losing congressional seats, and New Jersey and Massachu-
setts retain their respective number of seats. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CONGRESSIONAL
APPORTIONMENT, at http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/apportion-
ment.html (last modified Dec. 29, 2000). It will not be known what the difference
would have been, had the adjusted figures been used, until after the adjusted figures
are released on April 1, 2001. Utah filed a case challenging its loss of an additional
congressional seat to Georgia. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Eye on a Recount, For Seats
in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2001, at A14. But the basis of that case is not the
undercount, but rather in where people are counted. It is therefore inapplicable in this
analysis.
86. 13 U.S.C. § 141(c) (1994). This set of data is commonly referred to as the "PL
94-171" file.
87. See Steven A. Holmes, The Big Census Issue: Using Sampling in Redistricting,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, § 1, at 24; Virginia v. Reno, 117 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C.
2000).
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pelled by the Constitution in order to preserve the principle of
"one person, one vote," by restoring population equality among
the same kind of districts within a state.88
A number of states have enacted laws or are considering legisla-
tion prohibiting the use of adjusted census data for redistricting.8 9
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, and Virginia have already
adopted such laws.9° New Jersey9' and other states are considering
similar legislation.92 When using unadjusted data, redrawn districts
can be made to appear to contain the same number of residents.
However, because unadjusted data reflect localized undercounts
and overcounts within a state, in truth, districts will be unequal in
population size.
For example, when using raw data, one can draw all state senate
district boundaries so that each district contains 200,000 people.
But the adjusted and more accurate census data will show that one
state senator actually represents 300,000 residents, diluting those
residents' voting power, while another represents only 100,000.
When some districts are more populous than others, voters in these
districts will be given more representation than voters in other dis-
tricts.93 This is violative of the principle of "one person, one
vote." 94
88. For congressional districts, see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); for
state and local legislative districts, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
89. Nat'l Democratic Redistricting Project, State By State Round-Up, IMPAC
NEWS, May 2000, at 2 for a review of states and legislation.
90. Id. at 2.
91. Id. (listing Assem. 2939 (adopted)); Assem. 1682, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000)
(pending, companion to Assem. 2939); Steven A. Holmes, New Jersey Is a Battle-
ground As States Inherit Census Fight, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2000, at Al.
92. The states include Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Utah,
Tennessee, and Texas. Nat'l Democratic Redistricting Project, State By State Round-
Up, IMPAC NEWS, May 2000, at 2.
93. See GERSH & STRAMA, UNDERCOUNT BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, supra
note 31; Steven A. Holmes, New York Hardest Hit by Census Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 1998, at B6.
94. Significant deviations from the ideal population are generally impermissible,
although different tests and levels of tolerance for deviation differ by district type. For
congressional districts, the authority for one person, one vote lies in Article I, so the
standard is "strict equality" in population. E.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727-
28, 732, 741 (1983) (striking down a congressional districting plan with a population
deviation of 0.698%). For state and local legislative districts, the authority lies in the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so the standard is the lesser
"substantive equality." E.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763 (1973) (upholding a
state legislative districting plan with a population deviation of 9.9%). Notwithstanding
the differences, the use of raw census data will likely produce much greater devia-
tions, which will likely be violative of the Constitution.
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Furthermore, using raw data to redraw voting districts will frus-
trate the goals of equal representation for racial and ethnic minori-
ties. The undercount and overcount vary by race,95 therefore,
districts drawn using raw data will not accurately reflect the num-
ber of minorities living in those districts. 96 Such districts, particu-
larly those that encompass sizable racial and ethnic minority
communities, will, in reality, be larger in population than districts
without or with fewer racial and ethnic minorities.97  By dis-
advantaging these minority groups when electing representatives of
their choice,98 the voting strength of racial and ethnic minorities
will be impermissibly diluted in violation of the Voting Rights
Act.99
In addition to the issues raised by using statistical sampling, ad-
vocacy groups have advanced other census policy changes, 100 com-
munity-based organizations have conducted promotional
95. THE PLAN FOR CENSUS 2000, supra note 20, at 5-6 (1997); LCED, CENSUS
2000, supra note 14, at 12.1; see also supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
96. GERSH & STRAMA, UNDERCOUNT BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, supra note
31; PRESIDENTIAL MEMBERS, supra note 32, at 1.
97. PRESIDENTIAL MEMBERS, supra note 32, at 11-13.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b) (1994) (noting that minority voter dilution occurs
when members of a racial or ethnic minority "have less opportunity than other mem-
bers of the electorate to ... elect representatives of their choice").
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b) (1994). There was some early litigation over whether
states could affirmatively opt to use raw census data for redistricting. Virginia v.
Reno, 117 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2000). Virginia enacted a law mandating that data
for redistricting must be exclusively derived from a strict enumeration. Reno, 117 F.
Supp. 2d at 47, 49. Because Virginia has a history of proven de jure minority voter
discrimination, it is covered under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, whereby any
change to an election or voting procedure must be precleared. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)-
(b), 1973c (1994); Reno, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 50. Virginia sought declaratory judgment
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia concerning the need for
preclearance of its new law. Reno, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 47-48. Attorneys representing
minority voters argued that using raw census figures would offend both the Constitu-
tion and the Voting Rights Act, and that only the more accurate adjusted figures
should be used for intra-state redistricting. Reno, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 50-52. But the
state had not implemented the new law because it was not redrawing voting districts.
Reno, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 50-51. The court dismissed the case, without prejudice, be-
cause it was not ripe for adjudication. Reno, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 54. Nevertheless, the
result is that the new law was not precleared and therefore cannot take effect.
100. For example, groups successfully secured a legal opinion clarifying that the
federal law keeping census information confidential will continue to protect the ano-
nymity of undocumented immigrants. Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to
Andrew J. Pincus, General Counsel, Department of Commerce (May 18, 1999) (on
file with author and U.S. Departmentt of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel); Letter
from Glenn Magpantay, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, to Ken
Prewitt, Dir., U.S. Census Bureau, and Martina Hone, Associate Undersecretary for
Economics & Statistics Administration (Jan. 25, 1999) (on file with author).
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campaigns to ensure an accurate census count, and the Census Bu-
reau carried out a variety of innovative programs to encourage full
participation. 10 1 However, these programs have had varying de-
grees of success.10 2 The activities of community-based and advo-
cacy organizations and the Census Bureau's programs and policies
may have helped to encourage Asian American participation in the
census, but it is still doubtful that the headcount alone will yield an
accurate census. The final measurement of success will be discov-
ered when the census figures are released.
To ensure the most accurate and complete count possible in the
census, modern and accepted scientific techniques must be used to
Groups also secured a temporary moratorium on raids conducted by the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service during the census block-canvassing enumeration pe-
riod. Memorandum from Michael A. Pearson, Executive Associate Commissioner,
Office of Field Operations, INS, Department of Justice, to Regional Directors, Guide-
lines for INS Operations During Census 2000 and attached Guidelines for Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service Enforcement Operations During Census 2000 (Mar.
13, 2000) (on file with author); Letter from Asian American Legal Defense & Educa-
tion Fund and Asian American Task Force on the Census to President William J.
Clinton, Doris Meissner, INS Commissioner, Kenneth Prewitt, Census Director (July
1, 1999) (on file with author); Mae M. Cheng, INS Works Yields to That of Census,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 15, 2000, at A30.
In addition, groups successfully lobbied for the relaxation of the Bureau's hiring
policy to allow qualified bilingual non-citizen candidates to be hired for census-taker
positions. Memorandum from Debra Tomchek, Director for Human Resources Man-
agement, Chief Finance Officer, Assistant Secretary for Administration, Department
of Commerce, to Kenneth Prewitt, Director, Bureau of the Census (July 14, 1999) (on
file with author) (waiving the citizenship requirement for Census employees); 2000
Decennial Census Regional Census Center Administration Memorandum No. 99-113,
from Janet R. Cummings, Assistant Division Chief for Budget, Management, Over-
sight & Recruiting, Field Division, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce,
to All Regional Directors (July 23, 1999) (on file with author) (announcing changes to
the Census Bureau's policy in hiring non-citizens); Letter from Karen Narasaki, Exec-
utive Director and Deepa Iyer, Staff Attorney, National Asian Pacific American Le-
gal Consortium, to Secretary William Daley, Department of Commerce, and Director
Kenneth Prewitt, Bureau of the Census (Aug. 23, 1999) (on file with author) (expres-
sing concerns about the hiring of non-citizens).
101. These programs included: partnerships with national and local community-
based organizations throughout the nation, resulting in grassroots community educa-
tion campaigns about the importance of the census; the hiring of hundreds of "part-
nership specialists" to perform outreach to communities of color; a first-ever national
paid advertising campaign, as well as advertising targeted to specific undercounted
communities; and bilingual assistance programs such as census questionnaire forms in
six languages (English, Spanish, Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, and Korean), and
Questionnaire Assistance Guides to answering the English census forms in forty-nine
languages, all in the hopes of facilitating full participation in the census. U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS-THE PLAN FOR CEN-
sus 2000, supra note 20, at 10-13, 21.
102. MAGPANTAY & Liu, supra note 41; Alvord, supra note 41; Becker, supra note
41; Cheng, supra note 41; Myers, supra note 41; Stout, supra note 41.
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adjust the raw census figures. Accurate data must be used in redis-
tricting. An accurate census is a critical first step toward ensuring
the fair political representation of Asian Americans, and all com-
munities of color.1 0 3
II. MEANINGFUL REPRESENTATION OF ASIAN AMERICANS
THROUGH REDISTRICTING
The next step in ensuring the meaningful representation of
Asian Americans is in the redrawing of congressional, state legisla-
103. In addition, other barriers to the vote, such as anti-Asian voter discrimination
and language accessibility must be eliminated. Anti-Asian voter discrimination, har-
assment, and intimidation must be forcefully addressed. See Diaz v. Silver, 978 F.
Supp. 96, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 522 U.S. 801 (1997) (citing Affidavit of Michael
Shen for Defendant-Intervenor at 9 25 (citing examples of anti-Asian voter discrimi-
nation)). Local elections officials typically have ignored such charges or dismissed
them as isolated incidents. However, a disturbing trend can be found at polling sites
located in neighborhoods with growing Asian American communities, especially
those displacing an entrenched, largely white community. Perpetrators of anti-Asian
voter discrimination must be forcefully reprimanded, removed from their posts if they
are elections officials, and, when necessary, prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.
Almost two-thirds of all Asian Americans speak a language other than English in
their homes. STATISTICAL RECORD OF ASIAN AMERICANS 128 (Susan B. Gall &
Timothy L. Gall eds., 1993). In New York City, community exit polls showed almost
half of Chinese Americans and almost a third of all Asian Americans did not read
English very well. NAPAL, CONDUCTING ExIT POLLS: A GUIDE TO USING EXIT
POLLS TO PROMOTE AND SAFEGUARD ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN VOTER PARTICIPA-
TION 3 (1995). Thus, even though Asian Americans may be citizens, the right to vote
is futile when ballots and voting instructions cannot be understood. See S. TITO SINHA
ET AL., ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, ASIAN AMERICAN PARTICIPA-
TION IN THE 1993 NEW YORK CITY SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS 14 (1993) [hereinafter
1993 AALDEF SCHOOL BOARD REPORT]; MARGARET FUNG ET AL., ASIAN AMERI-
CAN PARTICIPATION IN THE 1996 NEW YORK CITY COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD
ELECTIONS 14 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 AALDEF SCHOOL BOARD REPORT].
The Language Assistance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act mandates that voter
registration forms, ballots, referenda, voting instructions, other voting materials, and
interpreters to render oral language assistance must be provided in a language other
than English in certain counties. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994); Imple-
mentation of the Voting Rights Act Regarding Language Minority Groups, 28 C.F.R.
§ 55.16 (2000). Currently, ten counties in New York, California, and Hawaii are cov-
ered under these provisions. Id. § 55, app. However, sometimes programs for provid-
ing materials have been poorly implemented, resulting in large numbers of voters
being turned away at the voting booth for relatively minor inconsistencies. Claire
Hsiang, Editorial, Burned at the Ballot Box, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1996, at 19; Rose
Kim, Voting Block; Asian-Americans Say Foul-Ups Kept Them From Polls, NEWSDAY,
May 10, 1996, at A3; Jacques Steinberg, Election Day for School Boards Mixes Apa-
thy, Anger and Disgust, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1996, at B1. Other times, due to the Act's
test for coverage, such materials have been denied altogether, thus preventing some
Asian communities from participating in the democratic process. Kim, supra. The de-
nial has been most serious for Korean Americans in New York. Kim, supra. Section
203 must be fully implemented and expanded, particularly as the Asian American
community grows in New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts.
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tive, and local district boundaries. Asian Americans comprise siza-
ble communities throughout the Northeast, particularly in New
York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. But redistricting that aims
to ensure that Asian Americans have a fair opportunity to elect a
candidate of their choice must maneuver cautiously through the
Supreme Court's maze of recent voting rights decisions.10 4 At the
outset, advocates must review Asian American residential geogra-
phy and communities. The following are examples.
New York City has more than 800,000 Asian Americans. Within
the city, existing Asian American neighborhoods are growing and
new communities are taking root in each borough. 105 Citywide, the
largest communities are Chinese and South Asians, specifically In-
dians, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis, followed in number by Kore-
ans and Filipinos. In Brooklyn, most Asian Americans are
Chinese,1 °6 followed by Pakistanis.0 7 In Manhattan, the over-
whelming majority of Asian Americans are Chinese living in Chi-
natown, though they have also moved into areas throughout the
Lower East Side. In Queens, a mix of Asian Americans in Flush-
ing,108 Jackson Heights/Elmhurst, 109 and Sunnyside/Woodside" °have surged in numbers. Chinese,"' Korean,1 2 Indian," 3 and Fili-
104. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995);
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
105. See generally NYC DEP'T OF CrY PLANNING, THE NEWEST NEW YORKERS
1990-1994: AN ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION TO NYC IN THE EARLY 1990s (1996);
NYC DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, THE NEWEST NEW YORKERS 1995-1996: AN UP.
DATE OF IMMIGRATION TO NYC IN THE MID '90S (1999).
106. Chinese live primarily in Sunset Park, and increasingly in Bensonhurst,
Sheepshead Bay, and Northern Bay Ridge. See id.
107. Most Pakistanis live in Coney Island and Midwood. See id. There is also a
growing South Asian, mostly Bangladeshi and Pakistani, community in the area
around the intersection of Church Avenue and MacDonald Street. See id.
108. Flushing is mostly Chinese and Koreans, followed by South Asians. See id.
109. Jackson Heights and Elmhurst are adjoining neighborhoods. Jackson Heights
is a mix of South Asians, including Indians, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis. Elmhurst
seems to be mostly Indian, with growing numbers of Chinese and Filipinos. Id. at 89-
90.
110. Likewise, Sunnyside and Woodside are adjoining neighborhoods. Both neigh-
borhoods are a mix of South Asians, predominately Indians and some Bangladeshis,
with large Filipino, Chinese, and Korean populations. Id. at 90.
111. In addition to Flushing and Elmhurst, the Chinese population is also growing
in Rego Park and Corona. Id. at 90.
112. In addition to Flushing and Woodside, the Korean population is also growing
in Bayside and Little Neck. Id.
113. In addition to Jackson Heights, Elmhurst, Sunnyside, and Woodside, the In-
dian population is also increasing in Queens Village, Glen Oaks, and Floral Park. Id.
20011
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pino' 14 communities continue to grow across the borough. There
also has been exceptional migration of Bangladeshis 115 and Indo-
Caribbeans into New York throughout the 1990s.116 In 2000, the
census estimates that nearly one-in-five Queens residents will be
Asian American. 17
In New Jersey, Jersey City has large Filipino and Indian popula-
tions, along with a sizable Latino community. More Indians, and
some Pakistanis, are moving into Edison, Parsipany, and Elizabeth.
Koreans are increasing in numbers throughout the northeastern
New Jersey peninsula bordering New York City, notably in Pali-
sades Park, Fort Lee, Union City, and Ridgefield.
In Massachusetts, there also are expanding Asian American
communities." 8 The population of Cambodians in the cities of
Lowell, Lynn, and Fall River,"1 9 Vietnamese in Dorchester, and
Chinese in Boston's Chinatown continue to grow at a fast rate. 2 °
Chinese and Korean communities are growing in numbers in
Quincy and Lexington.' 21 More South Asians are moving to
Brookline.122
In these growing communities, Asian Americans frequently have
entered races for elective office, but their defeat has been just as
common.123 One explanation may lie in the racial composition of
114. Filipinos have long lived in Woodside and Hollis. They are also migrating to
Sunnyside, Briarwood, and Astoria. Id.
115. Most Bangladeshi migration has not only been to Jackson Heights, Elmhurst
and Sunnyside, but particularly Long Island City and the southern parts of Astoria.
Id.
116. Perhaps the most intriguing growth in the Asian American population since
1990 has been the migration of Indo-Caribbeans, ethnic Indians who were originally
imported as indentured servants to Caribbean nations and then migrated from
Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad to the United States. Most are living in
Ozone Park, South Ozone Park, and Richmond Hill. Id.
117. POPULATION DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COUNTIES RANKED BY ASIAN
AND PACIFIC ISLANDER POPULATION, JULY 1, 1999 (CO-99-17) (estimating that, in
1999, seventeen-percent of all Queens residents are Asian American), http://
www.census.gov/population/estimates/county/rank/api-r.txt (August 30, 2000). In
1999, Queens had the largest Asian American population on the East Coast, and was
ranked fifth largest in the nation. Id.
118. Tom L. Chung, Asian Americans in Enclaves-They are Not One Community:
New Modes of Asian American Settlement, 5 ASIAN AM. POL'Y REV. 78, 79-80 (1995).
119. Amanda Milkovits, More Asians, Hispanics call Bay State Home, PROVIDENCE
JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Sept. 5, 2000 at 1C.
120. Chung, supra note 118, at 87-88.
121. Id. at 83, 90.
122. See id. at 81.
123. Seth Mydans, In Rough World of American Politics, Asian-Americans Stand
Out, As Rare, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1993, at A16.
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the districts from which they run. 12  Racially polarized voting still
abounds. 25 The composition of voting districts can facilitate or
dampen prospects for Asian Americans to elect a candidate of
their choice. In the past, Asian American involvement in redis-
tricting has been defensive, by guarding against the gerrymander-
ing of Asian American enclaves. At the same time, Asian
Americans have acted affirmatively by seeking to enhance minor-
ity voter representation by creating inclusive legislative bodies.
A. Background: Defensive and Affirmative Redistricting
The Voting Rights Act guards against the dilution of minority
voting strength through redistricting, regardless of whether that di-
lution is caused by racial gerrymandering or whether the redistrict-
ing process merely has that effect. 126 The Act guards against the
drawing of voting districts that split minority voters between two or
more districts so that minority communities are unable to elect a
minority representative. 127 Asian American neighborhoods have
not been immune from such racial gerrymandering. For instance,
124. In addition to the voting system and composition of districts, the lack of com-
prehensive campaign finance reform also has disadvantaged many Asian Americans
in running for elective office. Asian American challengers are particularly disadvan-
taged in that they have much more difficulty than white challengers in raising the
necessary funds to mount viable campaigns. See Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Money and
the Politics of Inclusion: The Impact of Campaign Finance Reform on the Represen-
tation of Women and People of Color, Conference at New York University School of
Law, New York (May 3, 1999). In order for Asian Americans to have a meaningful
vote, candidates must have a real chance at winning. Thus, Asian Americans should
be a part of the broader movement for progressive campaign finance reform. Simi-
larly, campaign finance reform groups must work to bring people of color into efforts
for reform, as well as respond to their particular concerns in reform. See, e.g., Sympo-
sium, Continuing to Build a Movement: Legal and Grassroots Strategies, 43 How. L. J.
87, 88 (1999) (published as part of a larger Symposium entitled "Campaign Finance as
a Civil Rights Issue," hosted by the National Voting Rights Institute and Howard
University School of Law in Washington, D.C. on February 12-13, 1999); Brennan
Center for Justice, supra (comments of Margaret Fung, Asian American Legal De-
fense and Education Fund and Marisa Demeo, Mexican American Legal Defense and
Education Fund) (expressing concerns about restrictions in the ability of legal perma-
nent residents to contribute to political campaigns and proposals mandating that can-
didates only raise campaign money from within the district).
125. Racially polarized voting refers to when race is the predominant consideration
of voters in electing representatives: whites vote almost exclusively for white candi-
dates, while minorities voters vote almost exclusively for minority candidates.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
127. Often this is referred to as "fracturing." E.g., Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.
Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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in the 1982 New York State legislative redistricting, Chinatown was
split between two State Assembly districts. 1
28
But enforcement of the Voting Rights Act has, at times, failed to
protect Asian Americans from other districting outcomes with less
than favorable prospects for meaningful representation. In one sit-
uation, Asian American communities are kept together, but
lumped into a district with a set of voters who have nothing in com-
mon with the Asian American community, or worse, have adverse
interests.
For example, in the 1991 New York City Council redistricting,
the district that was supposed to give representation to Manhat-
tan's Chinatown, where mostly lower-income Chinese reside, was
folded into the heavily white, upscale communities of Soho,
TriBeCa, and Battery Park City.129 In Queens, some believe the
City Council district representing the largely Korean and Chinese
neighborhood of Flushing was carefully drawn around the white
incumbent's powerbase. 3 ° In Boston, Massachusetts, the state
senate district encompassing Boston Chinatown was drawn to lump
Chinatown with the largely Irish political powerbase of South Bos-
ton. Chinese Americans were incorporated in the district simply to
make up for population differences, not for any intention of giving
them any sort of representation. In each of these examples, Asian
Americans were kept together but were completely outvoted.
They were not only totally unable to elect an Asian American can-
didate, but also locked out of electing anyone who would be re-
sponsive to their interests.
Asian Americans must be involved in redistricting to ensure
their communities are not fragmented, nor their vote diluted.
Though the Voting Rights Act will guard against blatant discrimi-
nation, it has not always guarded against more subtle forms of po-
litical disenfranchisement.
128. Margaret Fung, Asian Americans Ignored in Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
1982, at A24; New Redistricting Plan Splits Chinatown, N.Y. NICHIBEI, July 15, 1982.
In fact, during President Reagan's first term, the Justice Department approved of the
plan. See Press Release, Asian American Legal Defense & Education Fund, AAL-
DEF Criticizes Justice Department's Approval of New York Redistricting Plan Divid-
ing Chinatown (July 6, 1982) (on file with author).
129. AALDEF, City Council Changes: a Disappointment, OUTLOOK, Spring 1992,
at 1 [hereinafter City Council Changes]; Margaret Fung, New York Forum About
Politics: A District Like a Mosaic, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Apr. 12, 1991, at 60 (advocating for
a City Council district that included Chinatown with the Lower East Side) [hereinaf-
ter A District Like a Mosaic].
130. City Council Changes, supra note 129, at 1; Dugger, supra note 8.
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B. Legal Background to Redistricting
Law-makers and district-drawers' 3 ' are guided by a number of
traditional and some constitutional districting criteria. 132 Districts
must be equal in population 133 and they cannot be drawn intention-
ally to discriminate against minority voters. 34 Districts must be
compact 135 and contiguous.136 Borders should preserve political
and municipal boundaries, without crossing between towns, cities,
and counties. 37 Finally, they must encompass "communities of in-
terest," groupings of people who have similar values, shared inter-
ests, or common characteristics. 38
Other common and acceptable redistricting criteria include
drawing districts that: protect the reelection of incumbents or avoid
contests between two incumbents; 39 preserve the core of the prior
district; 140 preserve natural geographical boundaries (i.e., borders
do not cross bodies of water, rivers, or mountain terrain);141 and
prevent retrogression of minority voting strength and representa-
tion.' 42 Race and ethnicity may legitimately be considered in the
131. District-drawers are the technicians who typically work for the law-makers in
drawing districts.
132. See NCSL, REDISTRICrING LAW, supra note 48, at 75-76 for a review of states
which also mandate constitutionally or statutorily compactness, contiguity, preserva-
tion of political subdivisions, preservation of communities of interest, incumbency
protection, and preserving the core of prior districts.
133. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727-28, 732, 741 (1983); Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-208 (1962).
134. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 914
(1996).
135. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959-60 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646
(1993); DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1414-15 (E.D. Cal. 1994), affd and ap-
peal dismissed, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995).
136. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993).
137. Id.; Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98 (1997).
138. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 100 (1997); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
915-16 (1995).
139. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98 (1997).
140. Id.
141. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (noting that a "reapportionment plan
that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are
otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries . . . bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid").
142. Retrogression analysis is put into force when the jurisdiction is covered under
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1996); 28 C.F.R. 51, app. (1997). Coverage under § 5 usually comes about when the
jurisdiction had a history of minority voter discrimination. City of Lockhart v. United
States, 460 U.S. 125, 134-35 (1983); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
The current legal benchmark to measure retrogression is in flux. Reno v. Bossier Par-
ish School Board, 520 U.S. 471, 478-80, 486 (1997).
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redistricting process; however they cannot predominate,143 in that
the consideration of race does not subordinate the aforementioned
"traditional" districting principles. 14
4
In the past, minority voting rights advocates have been involved
in redistricting to facilitate the representation of people of color
through the redrawing of what were then called "majority-minor-
ity" voting districts and now often are referred to as "minority-
opportunity" districts. 4 5 In order to draw such districts, the U.S.
Supreme Court originally held in the 1986 landmark case, Thorn-
burg v. Gingles, that three preconditions were required. 146 The mi-
nority community had to: (1) be sufficiently numerous and
compact to form a majority in a single voting district; (2) be politi-
cally cohesive, in that members of the minority group tend to vote
alike; and (3) suffer from racially polarized voting, where the white
majority votes as a bloc so as to routinely defeat the minority
group's preferred candidate. 47
Adhering to these principles, a great many new majority-minor-
ity voting districts across the nation were drawn at the local, state,
and federal levels after the 1991 redistricting. 148 The effort was
143. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-16 (1995); see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
642-44 (1993).
144. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-16 (1995).
145. I prefer the term "minority-opportunity," rather than a "majority-minority"
voting districts. Technically, a "majority-minority" voting district is a district in which
the minority population is, essentially, at least fifty percent plus one or more. The
minority group's vote can, independent of any other voting group, select the represen-
tative of the district. However, I prefer "minority-opportunity" voting districts, be-
cause in essence that is what such districts seek. They look to give the minority group
a fair chance, or an opportunity, to elect a candidate of their choice. These districts
are particularly needed in a climate of racially polarized voting. This discussion will
continue in more detail infra Section II.C. I will use both terms interchangeably but
will use "majority-minority" to refer to districts drawn in the past or when most of the
commentary and litigation has used this terminology. I will assert "minority-opportu-
nity" as a new way to describe future districts which give minorities a fair chance at
electoral success.
146. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
147. Id. The minority community also had to suffer from racial discrimination
under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 55. Justice Stevens stated that this analy-
sis is conducted by a review of "objective factors" codified in the Senate Report ac-
companying the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 36-37, 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Fourteen states adopted congressional redistricting plans that doubled the
number of congressional majority-minority districts from twenty-six to fifty-two. Bush
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1041 nn.37-38 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Some conservative commentators argue that majority-minority districts are not
needed to achieve minority representation. See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, Voting
Rights: Another Affirmative Action Mess, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2031 (1996). They point
out that people of color such as Governor Douglas Wilder of Virginia and Mayor
David Dinkins of New York City are elected from both majority-white and majority-
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highly successful, especially for African Americans and Latinos. 4 9
However, these redistricting criteria set a threshold that denied
some racial and ethnic groups-largely due to insufficient size or
geographic dispersion-the ability to gain representation through
majority-minority districts.' 50
Throughout the 1990s, the Court further cut back on districting
that enfranchised people of color.15 ' Beginning with the astonish-
ing 1992 decision in Shaw v. Reno, the Court announced, for the
first time, that white voters could assert a claim of voter discrimina-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause when drawn into a major-
ity-minority voting district. 5 2 Then, in 1995, in Miller v. Johnson,
minority areas. See id. at 2040 n.32. However, supporters of majority-minority districts
counter that nearly every African American member of the U.S. House of Represent-
atives is elected from a district with a black majority population. Brenda Wright, Is
Race-Conscious Districting to Achieve Minority Representation Constitutional?: Yes:
Toward a Politics of Inclusion, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 44.
149. Fourteen new majority-black and Latino districts were created in eleven states,
and eleven new majority-Latino districts were added in six states. Frank R. Parker,
The Constitutionality of Racial Redistricting: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L.
REV. 1, 3 n.5 (1995).
150. Infra Section II.C.1; see, e.g., Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 129 n.22
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing how Asians do not meet Gingles test), affd, 522 U.S. 801
(1997) (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986)).
151. The modem voting rights cases should not be surprising in light of the Court's
conservative colorblind jurisprudence, most notably revealed in its anti-affirmative
action cases, such as Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Linda
Greenhouse, In Step on Racial Policy N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at Al. For a fuller
discussion of the Court's colorblindness jurisprudence via education, business, and
redistricting, see Frank R. Parker, The Damaging Consequences of the Rehnquist
Court's Commitment to Color-Blindness Versus Racial Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 763
(1996).
152. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649-50 (1993). But see United Jewish Orgs. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 150-66 (1977) (holding that white voters may not challenge a
districting plan that includes majority-minority districts to promote minority represen-
tation). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's reasoning in Shaw was quite remarkable.
First, she likened districts that gave racial and ethnic minorities representation to "po-
litical apartheid." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647. Second, she intimated that minority repre-
sentatives were somehow ineffective in representing white voters. See Shaw, 509 U.S.
at 656-58. Third, she placed higher standards and strict scrutiny on districts giving
minorities increased representation, see Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653-56, but such standards
are seldom applied to majority-white districts, see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1035-36
(1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Fourth, when a person of color is elected from an
oddly shaped district, that district's shape is now a matter of constitutional inquiry.
See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649-50; see also Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expres-
sive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Ap-
pearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 484 (1993). In Shaw, O'Connor
described the district as "bizarre" in its shape. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 655. But in drawing
districts, a multitude of factors and considerations come into play. Non-square and
non-cyclical shapes are destined. Pildes & Niemi, supra, at 441-53; Daniel D. Polsby &
Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry Into the Problems of Racial Gerrymandering
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the Court elaborated upon Shaw, holding that race could not be
the predominant criterion in redrawing voting districts.'53 In this
analysis, the consideration of race is allowed, but may not
subordinate "traditional race-neutral districting principles" such as
compactness, contiguity, respect for geographic and political
boundaries, and preservation of communities of interest.154 Thus,
without more, the intentional drawing of majority-minority dis-
tricts, even with the benevolent intention of enfranchising minority
voters, and even when they meet the Gingles preconditions, is
deemed unconstitutional. Consequently, majority-minority voting
districts in North Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Florida,
New York, and Virginia were struck down under Shaw and
Miller. 55
In preparation for the 2001 redistricting, minority voting rights
advocates and district-drawers are exploring ways to reconcile
these cases with the goal of expanding the representation of tradi-
tionally underrepresented communities. Asian Americans must be
involved in efforts to safeguard the drawing of minority-opportu-
nity districts, while also exploring new strategies that will lead to
expanded minority representation.
C. Redistricting and the Asian American Experience
Two traditional strategies to enfranchise minority voters have
been the drawing of "minority-opportunity" and "minority-influ-
ence districts.' 1 56 Minority-opportunity districts, previously known
as "majority-minority districts," facilitate the actual representation
Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 652, 653 (1993). For a Court whose
jurisprudence is supposedly "colorblind," its decisions render an exacerbation of color
differentials and the insurgence of racial disenfranchisement under the law.
153. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
154. Id.
155. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (Texas); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995) (Georgia); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (North Carolina); Diaz v. Silver,
978 F. Supp. 96, 115-16 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (per curiam), affd, 522 U.S. 801 (1997) (New
York); Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997), affd, 521 U.S. 113
(1997) (Virginia); Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 360, 370 (W.D. 1996) (per curiam),
appeal dismissed as moot, 518 U.S. 1014 (1996) (Louisiana); Johnson v. Mortham, 926
F. Supp. 1460, 1466 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (Florida). In Illinois, a majority-minority voting
district was challenged, however it survived the Court's scrutiny. King v. Illinois Bd.
of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1996), vacated, 519 U.S. 978 (1996), remanded
to, 979 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff'd, 522 U.S. 1087 (1998).
156. J. GERALD HEBERT ET AL., THE REALISTS' GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING,
AVOIDING THE LEGAL PITFALLS 10-51 (2000); see generally NCSL, REDISTRICTING
LAW, supra note 48, at 47-98 (discussing efforts to enfranchise minority voters).
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of racial and ethnic minority groups in the legislature.157 They can
give the minority group a fair and real opportunity to elect a mi-
nority candidate, or a candidate who will represent their interests,
as guaranteed by the Voting Rights Act. 158 In minority-influence
districts, the minority population typically constitutes less than a
majority, but is a sizable enough portion of the population (such as
thirty percent) that its vote will influence the outcome of a race.' 59
A strategy for drawing either Asian-opportunity or Asian-influ-
ence districts must ensure that Asian American demographics and
residential patterns 60 comport with existing law. New theories
such as Asian American "communities of interests" are instrumen-
tal in this effort.
1. Asian Opportunity Districts and the Gingles Limitations
To draw Asian American-opportunity districts, the Gingles v.
Thornburg preconditions' must be satisfied. Notwithstanding the
number and sizes of Asian American population clusters, the first
Gingles precondition has been difficult to meet on the East
Coast.' 6 ' In the past, Asian American population clusters on the
East Coast have been insufficiently large and compact to form a
majority in most types of districts. Asian Americans, though nu-
merous, tended to be geographically dispersed in their residential
patterns. Census estimates project that this might continue after
2000, especially for large congressional districts. But in much
smaller districts, like those for the lower house of the state legisla-
ture or for town councils, Asian American communities may be
both large enough and geographically compact enough to consti-
tute majorities. Alas, sufficient size is only the first precondition.
157. Brief for the Congressional Black Caucus as Amicus Curiae in Support of Ap-
pellants at 12, United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) (No. 94-558), reprinted in A.
Leon Higginbotham, United States v. Hays: Brief for the Congressional Black Caucus
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, 38 HOWARD L.J. 665, 665 (1995).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b) (1994).
159. E.g., Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1060 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (citing a
"large enough black population"); Rural West Tenn. African-American Affairs Coun-
cil, Inc. v. McWherter, 877 F. Supp. 1096, 1111 (W.D. Tenn.) (citing population of
41.6%), affd., 516 U.S. 801 (1995); see also NCSL, REDISTRICTING LAW, supra note
48, at 63-65.
160. See supra notes 105-22 and accompanying text.
161. E.g., Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 129 n.22 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 522 U.S.
801 (1997) (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986) (holding that Asians
were not large enough and too geographically dispersed to meet the Gingles precon-
ditions, at least insofar as to draw a majority-Asian district, using 1990 census data);
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUEs FACING ASIAN AMERICANS IN
THE 1990S 159 (1992).
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The dearth of data on Asian American voting patterns, particu-
larly on the East Coast, compounded by less than perfect census
data, has made it difficult to determine definitively whether Asian
Americans also meet the remaining Gingles preconditions. Com-
munity exit polls documenting Asian American voting behavior
162
have revealed some level of political cohesion among Asian Amer-
icans, even across ethnic lines. 163 But demonstrating the third pre-
condition, that the white majority votes as a bloc so as to regularly
defeat Asian American candidates, 164 has been challenging to
prove because of the sheer lack of viable Asian candidates on the
ballot. Without Asian American candidates, it is impossible to
prove that whites were voting against Asian American candidates.
And when there have been such candidates, they can sometimes
successfully draw upon electoral support from white
communities. 165
But when the Census Bureau releases the redistricting data, the
community may be able to satisfy Gingles. Asian Americans are
increasing in numbers throughout New York, New Jersey, and
162. E.g., Giuliani Captures Asian American Vote by 3-1, OUTLOOK (AALDEF),
Spring 1994, at 1; 3,264 Asian New Yorkers Polled on Election Day, OUTLOOK (AAL-
DEF), Winter 1997, at 1.
163. While some national mainstream exit polls or California community exit polls
report that Asian American seem to be fractured in their voting patterns, Asian
Americans on the East Coast tend to rally around candidates they believe represent
their interests. Political cohesion around candidates can be discerned, but party loy-
alty is largely absent. For example, in 1993, the Republican challenger for New York
City Mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, captured 67% of the Asian American vote, beating
out incumbent Democrat David Dinkins, who received 25% of the vote. In 1996,
President Clinton, running for re-election, captured 75% of the Asian American vote.
In 1998, Democratic challenger Representative Charles Schumer captured 69% of
Asian Americans vote, unseating eighteen-year incumbent Republican Senator Al-
fonse D'Amato. In each of these races, Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, and South Asians
tended to vote alike. UCLA ASIAN AM. STUDIES CTR., NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC
AMERICAN POLITICAL ALMANAC, 1998 Asian Pacific American Exit Polls 38 (9th ed.
2000-01); 3,264 Asian New Yorkers Polled on Election Day, OUTLOOK (AALDEF),
Winter 1997, at 1; Mae M. Cheng, Asian-Americans Deliver for Schumer, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 5, 1998; Giuliani Captures Asian American Vote by 3-1, OUTLOOK (AALDEF),
Spring 1994, at 1.
164. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-52, 55 (1986).
165. For instance, the few Asian American elected officials on the East Coast are
all elected from communities with majority white populations. Asian American
elected officials are in the state houses of West Virginia and Maryland and local gov-
ernments of Bergenfield and Holmdel, New Jersey and Newton, Westfield, Attleboro,
and Lowell, Massachusetts. UCLA ASIAN AM. STUDIES CENTER, NATIONAL ASIAN
PACIFIC AMERICAN POLITICAL ALMANAC (9th ed. 2000-01).
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Massachusetts. 66 Certain neighborhoods are becoming increas-
ingly Asian American.'67 Since 1990, there have been a slew of
Asian American candidates running for office, 68 many of whom
probably lost due to the realities of racially polarized voting.
Nevertheless, Gingles still presents serious hurdles for the Asian
American community. Asian American opportunity voting dis-
tricts may continue to be difficult to draw for most legislative bod-
ies. If so, multi-racial minority-opportunity and minority-influence
districts may be more viable options to ensure the meaningfully
representation of Asian Americans.
2. Emerging Strategies for Asian Americans
Multi-racial, minority-opportunity districts bring Asian Ameri-
cans into districts with other racial and ethnic minorities with simi-
lar interests.169 Together, they can constitute a majority of a
district's total population. Influence districts have proven to be a
somewhat successful remedial attempt to provide representation to
communities of color that have been too dispersed to be encom-
passed within a single majority-minority district. 7 ° These districts
give Asian American voters real opportunities to vote for candi-
dates who will represent their interests.
To draw such districts in light of Shaw and Miller, the districts
must not be drawn to strictly represent only Asian Americans.
Rather, they should contain "communities of interest,' 171 group-
166. See POPULATION DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATES RANKED BY ASIAN
AND PACIFIC ISLANDER POPULATION, JULY 1, 1999, http://www.census.gov/popula-
tion/estimates/state/rank/api.txt (August 30, 2000).
167. See generally NYC DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, THE NEWEST NEW YORKERS
1990-1994: AN ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION TO NYC IN THE EARLY 1990s (1996);
NYC DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, THE NEWEST NEW YORKERS 1995-1996: AN UP-
DATE OF IMMIGRATION TO NYC IN THE MID '90s (1999); Tom L. Chung, Asian Amer-
icans in Enclaves-They are Not One Community: Three Decades of Demographic
Changes, 5 ASIAN AMER. POL'Y REV. 78 (1995).
168. E.g., Leslie Casimir, Foreign-Born Pols Aim to Make Voices Heard, DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 24, 2000, at 14.
169. E.g., A District Like a Mosaic, supra note 129, at 60 (discussing a City Council
district that includes Chinese immigrants in Chinatown with Latino immigrants in the
Lower East Side).
170. E.g., Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1059-60 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Rural
West Tenn. African-American Affairs Council, Inc. v. McWherter, 877 F. Supp. 1096,
1107 (W.D. Tenn.); NCSL, REDISTRICTING LAW, supra note 48, at 63-65. To be clear,
influence districts should not be drawn in lieu of minority-opportunity districts. When
the minority population legitimately meets the Gingles preconditions, a minority-op-
portunity district should be drawn. NCSL, REDISTRICTING LAW, supra note 48, at 51.
171. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
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ings of people with "actual shared interests ' 172 and/or common
socio-economic characteristics, 73 that may be predominantly
Asian American. The AALDEF has successfully used the commu-
nity of interest strategy to defend majority-minority voting
districts.
Asian Americans successfully defended their community in Diaz
v. Silver, where they intervened on the side of Latino plaintiffs
challenging New York's 12th Congressional District.'74 That dis-
trict was drawn originally as a majority-Latino district, which is cur-
rently represented by the first Puerto Rican-born member of
Congress, Nydia Velsquez. Representative Velisquez has long
championed the interest of immigrants, the poor, and non-English
speakers. The district was a little more than fifty-four percent La-
tino, 7 5 and twenty-one percent of the population was Asian. 176 So
when the district was challenged under Shaw, Asian Americans in-
tervened as parties in the suit to protect the district. 177
The Asian intervenors argued that the Asian American commu-
nity in the district, which lived in Manhattan's Chinatown and
Brooklyn's Sunset Park, constituted a single "community of inter-
est" because they shared common socio-economic characteris-
tics. 178 They spoke a common Chinese dialect, read Chinese-
language newspapers, were employed in low-wage industries, had
low levels of formal U.S. education, rented their homes, rode the
same subway lines, and were immigrants and naturalized citi-
zens. 179 There were also many private and municipal health and
social service agencies serving both neighborhoods.180 Race was
simply one of many factors considered in drawing the district
172. Id. at 919.
173. Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
174. Id. at 116-17.
175. Boundaries in Dispute, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 27, 1997, at B2 (graphical chart and
map display) (sourcing Congressional Quarterly (based on 1980 and 1990 census
data)); High Court Stays Its Conservative Course, XLIX CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY ALMANAC 325-26 (listing Hispanic population as fifty-eight percent of popula-
tion of district).
176. Boundaries in Dispute, supra note 175.
177. Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing AALDEF Mem.
Support Intervention, at 1).
178. See Affidavit of Defendant-Intervenor Peter Lau at paras. 46-55; Affidavit of
Defendant-Intervenor John Kuo Wei Tchen paras. 9-38, Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp.
96, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (No. 95-CV-2591).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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lines.1 81 The court accepted this argument, holding that Asian
Americans in the 12th Congressional District were a single commu-
nity of interest, and should be kept together within the district. 82
In so holding, the Court allowed the district to be a constitutionally
permissible Asian-influence district.
However, the court did not accept the main arguments by the
state or Latino parties, which also tried to defend the district.
83
The court held that the consideration of race, at least for the Latino
community, predominated in the original drawing of the district
pursuant to Shaw and Miller. 8' Thus, the court compelled the
state to redraw the district's boundaries. 85 When the legislature
redrew the district, it reduced the Latino population, but kept the
Asian American communities together.186 Accordingly, the district
became a multi-racial, minority-opportunity district, where forty
percent of the residents are Latino and twenty percent are Asian
American. 87 The court accepted the new plan and the Supreme
Court summarily affirmed the new district lines. 88 Congress-
member Velisquez still represents the district, and she still champi-
ons the interest of immigrants, the poor, and non-English speakers.
Through the district, Asian Americans have enjoyed the meaning-
ful representation of their interests.
This successful defensive strategy can inform affirmative redis-
tricting.' 89 Notwithstanding the final result, the court rulings and
litigation strategy have been regarded as a way to reconcile the
Shaw decisions with the goal of safeguarding and increasing the
181. Memorandum of Law of Defendant-Intervenors Peter K. Lau and John Kuo
Wei Tchen in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, at 22-25, Diaz
v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (No. 95-Civ-2591).
182. Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 522 U.S. 801 (1997).
183. The State and Latino parties argued that Shaw and Miller did not apply; that if
they did apply, race was not a predominant criterion in redrawing the district; and
that even if race was a significant criterion in drawing the district, the district still
survived strict scrutiny. Id. at 115-16, 118-23, 130.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Jonathan P. Hicks, Albany Lawmakers Agree On Redrawn 12th District, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 1997, at B5.
187. Id.
188. Diaz v. Silver, 522 U.S. 801 (1997).
189. J. GERALD HEBERT ET AL., THE REALISTS' GUIDE TO REDISTRICrING:
AVOIDING THE LEGAL PITFALLS 23 (2000) (citing Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41
(1993)). The authors note that the Supreme Court has never addressed the question
whether multi-racial majority-minority districts are compelled under the Voting
Rights Act to remedy past racial discrimination.
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meaningful political representation of Asian Americans and other
racial and ethnic minorities.
Drawing districts on the basis of Asian American communities
of interest is not simply a legal fiction nor a proxy for race. 90
Asian American communities of interest may be viewed as smaller
subsets of the Asian American community. Race and ethnicity,
along with income level, educational level, English ability, and
other socio-economic characteristics, in addition to external factors
and common community concerns and issues, must be used to
prove that specific Asian American communities are communities
of interest. 191
An example of an Asian American community of interest could
be found in the Massachusetts' localities where Cambodians tend
to have a similar immigrant experience in that they came to the
United States as refugees, have limited English proficiency, have
little or no formal U.S. education, and are generally low-income.
Likewise, some Koreans communities in New Jersey are middle or
upper-middle class, employed as professionals, emigrated to the
U.S. around the same time, attend similar Christian churches, and
have limited English proficiency. In using Asian American com-
munities of interest as the criterion in redrawing voting district
boundaries, those districts will be constitutionally defensible.
Moreover, it is also possible that communities of interest could
be cross-racial, based on the immigrant experience, 92 economic
class, 93 or common neighborhood concerns. 94 This expands pos-
190. There must be "some common ["tangible"] thread of relevant interests"
among the community members. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995).
191. See Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1997). Another support-
ive method to prove the existence of a community of interest could be subjective,
when the racial or ethnic group, which already shares some socio-economic character-
istics, "regard themselves as a community." Id.
192. A District Like a Mosaic, supra note 129, at 60 (advocating for a City Council
district that includes Chinese immigrants in Chinatown with Latino immigrants in the
Lower East Side).
193. E.g., Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581 (1997) (discussing poor ur-
ban-dwelling Latinos); Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing
working class Asian and Latinos in the Lower East Side).
194. Karin Mac Donald, Preparing for Redistricting 2001-Communities Define
Their Interests 17 (Aug. 30, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Boston, Mass., Sept. 3-6, 1998). Professor Mac Donald conducted a study exploring
the concept of "community of interest" with members of the community. Professor
Mac Donald's study surveyed residents in Oakland, California. The project was recre-
ated by the AALDEF, as its Community Survey Project. AALDEF's study is survey-
ing Asian American community leaders in Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan, New
York. One ingenious component of the studies is giving individuals maps of the city
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sibilities for drawing multi-racial minority-opportunity districts, es-
pecially in situations where Asian Americans are too small in
number or geographically diffuse. By using the community of in-
terest strategy, multi-racial minority-opportunity and minority-in-
fluence districts, which seek to enfranchise Asian Americans, can
be drawn permissibly.195
In each of these contexts, whether the community seeks minor-
ity-opportunity or minority-influence districts, the need for coali-
tion building with other traditionally disenfranchised communities
is necessary. Asian Americans must explore common community
interests with African American and Latino communities. 196 Addi-
tionally, there may be some similar interests with multi-racial
groups, such as lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender, low-income, or
working-class communities. Common interests should be explored
with the broad goal of ensuring the redistricting process is fair for
all underrepresented communities.
Throughout the Northeast, more stable social, political, and ser-
vice institutions are being established in existing and emerging
Asian American neighborhoods. These institutions are engaging
and transforming immigrants into active civic participants. Redis-
tricting can help ensure Asian Americans will have some meaning-
ful representation in the legislature. However, redistricting may be
limited in that it does not guarantee self-representation. Possibili-
ties for self-representation may be enhanced with alternative vot-
ing systems.
I1. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE
FOR ASIAN AMERICAN REPRESENTATION
Because it has been difficult for Asian Americans to meet the
legal standards to form minority-opportunity voting districts, 97
some scholars argue for entirely new voting systems that have been
effective in giving a voice to traditionally underrepresented com-
and asking them to draw a line around what they perceived to be their neighborhood
boundaries. Respondents are then asked to explain the differences between the area
inside and outside the line drawn. The AALDEF study also asks respondents to re-
count "issues that concern people in the neighborhood" and select other city neigh-
borhoods which are "similar" in characteristics or concerns. AALDEF's study is still
ongoing and a report is expected to be released early in 2001.
195. Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 123 (1997).
196. E.g., A District Like a Mosaic, supra note 129, at 60 (discussing common inter-
ests between Chinese immigrants in Chinatown with Latino immigrants in the Lower
East Side).
197. Supra Section II.C.
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munities. These scholars suggest abandoning the redistricting pro-
cess altogether and propose proportional representation as a
solution. 198
A. Description of Proportional Representation
There are two chief methods for selecting democratically-elected
legislative bodies or delegations: single-member districts and pro-
portional representation ("PR"). 199
Single-member districts are used predominantly in the United
States.2° Under this system, voters residing in a voting district are
allowed to select only one candidate and may cast only one vote.
The candidate garnering the most votes in each district wins the
election, regardless of whether she has obtained even a simple ma-
jority of the votes cast.20 '
In contrast, proportional representation is used in most of the
world's established democracies. 0 2 Although experience with PR
in the U.S. has been limited, there are a number of jurisdictions,
198. See generally Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 908 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Dillard v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870, 875 (M.D. Ala., 1988), affd,
868 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1989); LANi GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 41(1994); Douglas J. Amy, District Shapes and Interest Representation, in CTR. FOR VOT-
ING & DEMOCRACY, VOTING AND DEMOCRACY REPORT 87 (1995) [hereinafter CVD
VOTING AND DEMOCRACY REPORT]; John B. Anderson, Opinion/Essays, Go Back to
the Drawing Board to Make More Votes Count, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 12,
1996, at 18; Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional Repre-
sentation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1991 (1993);
Letter from Cynthia McKinney, Congresswoman, to Congress, entitled A Bill to Al-
low Multi-Member Districts (July 14, 1995), in CVD VOTING AND DEMOCRACY RE-
PORT, supra, at 39; Deborah Ramirez, Multi-Racial Empowerment: It's Not Just Black
and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 976 (1995); Rob Richie, How to Imple-
ment PR in the U.S., in CVD VOTING AND DEMOCRACY REPORT, supra, at 15; Joseph
F. Zimmerman, The Federal Voting Rights Act and Alternative Election Systems, 19
WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 659 (1978).
199. THOMAS T. MACKIE & RICHARD ROSE, THE INTERNATIONAL ALMANAC OF
ELECTORAL HISTORY 503 (3d ed. 1991). Proportional representation ("PR") is not
one electoral system itself, but a general category that includes a variety of systems,
such as party list selection, limited voting, cumulative voting, preference or single
transferable voting, and single non-transferable voting. For a description of each sys-
tem, see Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System, in
CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM 3 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds.,
1984) [hereinafter CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM].
200. THOMAS T. MACKIE & RICHARD ROSE, THE INTERNATIONAL ALMANAC OF
ELECTORAL HISTORY 503 (3d ed. 1991); Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman, Choos-
ing an Electoral System, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 199, at 3.
201. Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System, in CHOOS-
ING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 199, at 3.
202. Id. Examples include India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Germany, Russia, and Spain.
Id. at 4.
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both historically and today, in which PR is used.2 °3 Under PR vot-
ing systems, non-plurality voting is usually operative in multi-mem-
ber districts or at-large elections. Voters are not given only one
vote, nor are they bound to select only one candidate. Rather, de-
pending on the specific type of PR system, voters simultaneously
may cast multiple votes for multiple candidates, cast more than one
vote for a single candidate, select a particular slate of candidates,
or rank candidates in order of preference.2 °4 PR is designed to give
increased representation to minority voting groups, whether they
are third-parties, politically cohesive people of color, or some other
grouping.2 °5
B. Comparison Between Proportional Representation and
Single-Member Districts
Single-member districts and PR have different bases for political
representation. Voting from single-member districts facilitates rep-
resentation based on geographic units.20 6 As originally envisioned
by the framers of the Constitution,0 7 geographic units, like neigh-
borhoods, have been good indicators of common political, cultural,
or ideological characteristics. On the other hand, PR allows indi-
viduals to group themselves together by the political interests
through which they define themselves, exercised and evidenced by
their voting patterns.20 8 As law professor and former civil rights
attorney Lani Guinier noted, PR shifts the focus of electing minor-
ity candidates from the external district-drawers to voters' choices
in the voting booth.20 9
203. PR was used for more than 110 years to elect the Illinois House of Represent-
atives. PR also is used in dozens of local town, city, and municipal elections in Ala-
bama, Arizona, California, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, and New York.
Amy, supra note 198, at 87; Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative
Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 259 (1995); Richie, supra note
198, at 15; Leon Weaver, Semi-Proportional and Proportional Representation Systems
in the United States, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 199, at 195.
204. Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System, in CHOOS-
ING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 199, at 3.
205. Id. at 7.
206. Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case
of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1603-05 (1993), reprinted in LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 119 (1994) [hereinafter Lani Guinier, The
Emperor's Clothes].
207. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) (citing 1THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 180 (Farrand ed. 1911)).
208. Douglas J. Amy, District Shapes and Interest Representation, in CVD VOTING
AND DEMOCRACY REPORT, supra note 198, at 90.
209. Lani Guinier, The Emperor's Clothes, supra note 206, at 1594.
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Both systems have been able to actualize the representation of
people of color in the legislature.210 Districts can work well when
those communities meet at least the first Gingles precondition
where they are large, compact, and reside in concentrated areas,211
like New York City's Harlem, Chinatown, or the Lower East Side.
Regularly-shaped districts can be drawn that include a significant
number of minority voters, who presumably also have common
interests.
There are likewise numerous examples of how PR has achieved
the same goals.212 Municipal PR voting systems have helped in-
crease the representation of Latinos throughout the Southwest, 13
and African Americans in Alabama, Illinois, Ohio, and New
York. 14 When proportional representation was first introduced to
elect the New York City School Boards, the representation of Afri-
can Americans and Puerto Ricans rose significantly, thereby better
reflecting their numbers in the city population.215
However, under traditional districting systems, Asian Americans
have been able to gain representation in limited circumstances.
Single-member districts have generally failed to give representa-
tion to groups when they are not large, compact, nor concentrated
enough to fill larger voting districts, such as congressional districts.
Asian Americans have had a much more positive experience
with PR than with single-member districts. Such success has been
210. Arend Lijphart, Trying to Have the Best of Both Worlds: Semi-Proportional
and Mixed Systems, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 199, at 209-11,
213.
211. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986); see also supra note 146 and
accompanying text.
212. Dillard v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870, 875 (M.D. Ala.,
1988), affd, 868 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1989). PR also has facilitated the election of
other underrepresented communities, such as women and gays and lesbians. Darren
Rosenblum, Geographically Sexual?: Advancing Lesbian and Gay Interests Through
Proportional Representation, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 119 (1996) (comment-
ing on the PR of lesbians and gays in the New York City School Board elections);
Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States,
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 275-76 (citation omitted) (discussing women in Alabama
county legislature).
213. Delbert A. Taebel et al., Alternative Electoral Systems as Remedies for Minor-
ity Vote Dilution, 11 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & PoL'Y 19, 26-29 (1990).
214. See George H. Hallett Jr., Proportional Representation with the Single Trans-
ferable Vote: A Basic Requirement for Legislative Elections, in CHOOSING AN ELECTO-
RAL SYSTEM, supra note 199, at 113, 123; David Van Biema, One Person, Seven Votes,
TIME, Apr. 25, 1994, at 42.
215. In 1973, a study by the United Parents Association found that the New York
City School Boards were much more ethnically representative than any of New
York's congressional, state legislative, or any recent city council elections. Hallett,
supra note 214, at 113, 123.
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most pronounced in the New York City School Board elections.216
In each recent election, Asian American candidates increasingly
have won, many with almost exclusive support from Asian Ameri-
can voters.217 This stands in stark contrast to Asian American can-
didates' experience in elections for other legislative bodies in New
York. Even with 800,000 Asian Americans, though there are fif-
teen Asian American elected officials in the school boards, no
Asian has been any elected to the city council, state legislature, or
Congress.21 8 PR advocates have been able to show that when
groups are not able to gain representation under single-member
districts, they can be more successful under proportional
representation.21 9
PR can be a way out of the quandary between achieving the goal
of minority representation and the Shaw cases, which are in tension
with such goals.22° Its supporters span the spectrum from law pro-
fessor and Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Nominee
Lani Guinier221 to Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas.222 PR
operates as an attractive colorblind solution to the under-
216. See 1993 AALDEF SCHOOL BOARD REPORT, supra note 103, at 10-11, 14;
1996 AALDEF SCHOOL BOARD REPORT, supra note 103, at 14; Anemona Hartocol-
lis, U.S. Rejects Voting Plan For Local School Boards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999 at B4;
Interview with Tito Sinha, Staff Attorney, AALDEF, in New York, N.Y. (June 15,
1999).
217. In 1993, six of a total of eleven Asian American candidates won. 1996 AAL-
DEF SCHOOL BOARD REPORT, supra note 103, at 1. In 1996, eleven of the total of
fifteen Asian American candidates won election. Id. at 1, 4; Jacques Steinberg, School
Board Election Results, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1996, § 13, at 11. In 1999, fifteen of a
total number of twenty-one Asian American candidates won. Lynette Holloway, This
Just In: May 18 School Board Election Results, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1999, § 14, at 3.
218. See Hartocollis, supra note 216.
219. Id.
220. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (recognizing that single-member dis-
trict plans may not be the best remedy to a violation of the Voting Rights Act);
Cousin v. McWherter, 904 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (suggesting that a non-
districting remedy could be pursued, such as cumulative voting); Steven J. Mulroy,
The Way Out: A Legal Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting
Rights Remedies, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 333, 350-52 (1998); Joseph F. Zimmer-
man, The Federal Voting Rights Act and Alternative Election Systems, 19 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 621, 659 (1978); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Center for Voting and
Democracy, Cane v. Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir. 1994) (No. 94-1579),
reprinted in part as Edward Still & Pamela Karlan, Cumulative Voting and the Voting
Rights Act, in CVD VOTING AND DEMOCRACY REPORT, supra note 198, at 94 ("Cu-
mulative voting avoids the needs for race conscious district drawing .... It does not
institutionalize the divisions in society by drawing a 'black district," a 'Latino district'
and a 'white district."').
221. See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994).
222. See generally Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 2594-2602 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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representation of people of color 23 and overcomes the obstacles
presented by the Supreme Court in Shaw and Miller.224 Justice
Thomas hailed PR because it treats people as individuals, and if
those individuals feel more comfortable identifying themselves
with a particular racial or ethnic identity, then PR is accommodat-
ing in the voting booth.225 Because Asian Americans commonly
vote for Asian American candidates, regardless of their party affili-
ation, Asian Americans may be able to gain greater representation
under PR.226
Moreover, some laud PR as superior because today, geographic
units are becoming less meaningful and less accurate as actual
proxies of public and civic identity.227 PR supporters argue that in
America's colonial period, many citizens were tightly bound to
their geographic areas.228 Today, however, many Americans are
less tied to and identify less with a particular geographic identity.2 29
For instance, twenty percent of all Americans move to a new
neighborhood every year.230 Neighborhoods are becoming increas-
ingly racially integrated.23' Thus, residents of voting districts are
developing political cleavages along lines of class, race, gender, and
ideology.232 Modern communication and transportation systems
223. Lani Guinier, The Emperor's Clothes, supra note 206, at 1617; Mary A. Inman,
Comment, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional Representation): Resuscitating a
Federal Electoral System, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1991 (1993); Deborah Ramirez, Multi-
Racial Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957,
977 (1995).
224. Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal Standard for Imposing Alternative
Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 333, 350-52
(1998).
225. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 2594-2602 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
226. See, e.g., 1993 AALDEF SCHOOL BOARD REPORT, supra note 103, at 13-14;
1996 AALDEF SCHOOL BOARD REPORT, supra note 103, at 14.
227. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1413, 1451 (1991), reprinted in LANi GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY
71 (1994) [hereinafter Guinier, No Two Seats].
228. Douglas J. Amy, District Shapes and Interest Representation, in CVD VOTING
AND DEMOCRACY REPORT, supra note 198, at 87, 89.
229. Lani Guinier, More Democracy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 8 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Lani Guinier, More Democracy].
230. Douglas J. Amy, District Shapes and Interest Representation, in CVD VOTING
AND DEMOCRACY REPORT, supra note 198, at 87, 89.
231. Id.; Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the
Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1147 (1991), reprinted in
LAN GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 41 (1994) [hereinafter Lani
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism].
232. Douglas J. Amy, District Shapes and Interest Representation, in CVD VOTING
AND DEMOCRACY REPORTf supra note 198, at 87, 89; Lani Guinier, The Triumph of
Tokenism, supra note 231, at 1147.
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also have changed the way people think of communities.233 In such
a complex and integrated society, advocates argue that PR is pref-
erable to antiquated single-member districts because PR can ac-
count for the many ways Americans identify, and ultimately vote
for, their shared interests. Yet, the continued existence of minority
neighborhoods is undeniable. While voters certainly define their
shared interests by ideology, occupation, economics, race, gender,
and sexual identity, they also continue to define those interests by
where they live.
Finally, PR advocates say that the system promotes coalition
building among various underrepresented groups.234 In the New
York School Board elections, the slating of candidates from various
Asian backgrounds often helped each ethnic group gain represen-
tation.235 It can also promote coalitions between Asian Americans
and other underrepresented groups like African American, Latino,
and lesbian and gay communities.236 Conversely, some PR advo-
cates argue that districting itself promotes inter-group conflict. In
a diverse geographic area, drawing districts to enfranchise one mi-
nority group is sometimes done at the expense of another minority
group.237 PR can minimize competing, even clashing group strug-
gles for representation.238
233. Tory Mast, History of Single Member Districts for Congress, in CVD VOTING
AND DEMOCRACY REPORT, supra note 198, at 37, 39; Lani Guinier, More Democracy,
supra note 229; e.g., Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (referring to the
use of subway lines).
234. Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 227, at 1491; Darren Rosenblum, Geo-
graphically Sexual?: Advancing Lesbian and Gay Interests Through Proportional Rep-
resentation, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 121 (1996).
235. See 1993 AALDEF SCHOOL BOARD REPORT, supra note 103, at 14.
236. Deborah Ramirez, Multi-Racial Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White
Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 987 (1995); Darren Rosenblum, Geographically Sex-
ual?: Advancing Lesbian and Gay Interests Through Proportional Representation, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 121 (1996).
237. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (showing example in Florida be-
tween Cuban Americans and African Americans); Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note
227, at 1453; Frank R. Parker, The Consequences of Racial Redistricting: A Critique of
Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REV. 1, 7 n.23, 45 (1995) (citing United Jewish Organizations
v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)) (showing example in New York between Hasidic Jews
and African Americans) Darren Rosenblum, Overcoming "Stigmas": Lesbian and
Gay Districts and Black Electoral Empowerment, 39 How. L.J. 149, 176-77 (1995)
(citing Interview with Judith Reed, General Council for the 1991 New York City Dis-
tricting Commission, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 27, 1993). But see King v. Illinois Bd.
of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1996), vacated, 519 U.S. 978 (1996), remanded
to, 979 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1997), affd, 522 U.S. 1087 (1998).
238. PR often avoids the zero-sum game as demonstrated in De Grandy and United
Jewish Organizations where neither group or only one group was accommodated.
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C. Concerns About Proportional Representation
Nevertheless, PR is not a panacea and is subject to many serious
criticisms. Some include the complexity of administering an elec-
tion by PR and the possibility of increased legislative factionaliza-
tion. Moreover, some concerns about PR have been lodged by
advocates from communities of color. Though PR facilitates the
election of underrepresented groups, certain prerequisites are re-
quired before such representation can be assured. Finally, the
most significant obstacle is the unlikelihood of adoption of a PR
system due to some legal, but mostly political, considerations.
1. Popular Concerns
PR tends to be more complicated to administer and difficult to
understand than districting systems.239 To PR's detriment, voting
from single-member districts is simple.24 ° In district elections,
there are usually only two choices, the voter has only one vote to
cast for only one candidate, and only one candidate is elected.24'
Under PR, because voters often have more than one vote, there
are more candidates, and more than one person can be elected.
In the 1996 New York City School Board election, where voters
ranked their first, second, third, etc., preferences, it took weeks for
the votes to be tallied and winners to be determined.242 When can-
didates did not win on the first round, but seats remained unfilled,
surplus votes were transferred to the voters' second choice candi-
dates and then the ballots were recounted.243 This transfer of votes
and recounting continued until all the seats were filled, resulting in
a time consuming process. This problem could be resolved par-
tially by using scannable computer ballots, as are used in Cam-
Deborah Ramirez, Multi-Racial Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Any-
more, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 975 (1995).
239. Leon Weaver, Semi-Proportional and Proportional Representation Systems in
the United States, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 199, at 191, 195;
Hartocollis, supra note 216 (quoting New York City Schools Chancellor Rudy Crew).
240. Arend Lijphart, Trying to Have the Best of Both Worlds: Semi-Proportional
and Mixed Systems, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 199, at 207, 208.
241. Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 227, at 1456 (discussing the limits this sys-
tem imposes on third parties).
242. Jacques Steinberg, In Tallying School Board Election Results, Time Is No Ob-
ject, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1996 at B3; Jacques Steinberg, Boards and Minds Are Little
Changed by School Election, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1996 at Al; Jacques Steinberg,
School Board Election Results, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1996, § 13, at 11.
243. Jacques Steinberg, In Tallying School Board Election Results, Time Is No Ob-
ject, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1996 at B3; Jacques Steinberg, Boards and Minds Are Little
Changed by School Election, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1996 at Al.
776
ASIAN AMERICAN VOTING RIGHTS
bridge, Massachusetts, which uses an identical PR system to elect
its city council.
PR is more abstruse than other voting schemes, like districting,
because a voter's multiple votes can be transferred or cumulated. 244
However, exit polls in localities using PR in the United States have
demonstrated that while voters are "uncomfortable" with PR, they
do tend to understand its voting rules.245 When voting instructions
are adequately provided in Asian languages, and knowledgeable
interpreters are on-site to provide assistance to both voters and
poll workers, many problems can be avoided.246
Lastly, the most common criticism of PR is that it increases legis-
lative factionalization, which thereby paralyzes governments. En-
actments usually require a majority, not simply a plurality, vote. A
coalition must be established each time to garner the necessary ma-
jority support. Legislative fragmentation leads to unmanageable
policy making. Critics often cite Israel and Italy as having disas-
trous PR election systems because of the multitude of parties.247
Candidates can gain a seat in the national legislature of those coun-
tries with less than two percent of the entire national electorate. 248
To avoid the problem of too many parties in the legislature, a
higher election threshold percent of the ballots cast can be imposed
to gain a seat.249 For example, Japan and Spain use a five percent
threshold to gain a seat;250 those governments are not unwieldy,
nor paralyzed by a proliferation of minority parties.
244. Leon Weaver, Semi-Proportional and Proportional Representation Systems in
the United States, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 199, at 191, 195;
Hartocollis, supra note 216 (quoting New York City Schools Chancellor Rudy Crew
describing the system as "hopelessly confusing"); Jacques Steinberg, Boards and
Minds Are Little Changed by School Election, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1996 at Al.
245. Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United
States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 284-85 (1995) (discussing Chilton County, Ala-
bama's use of PR cumulative voting).
246. Supra note 103; 1996 AALDEF SCHOOL BOARD REPORT, supra note 103, at
11-12, 14.
247. It's the Same Old Italy, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2000, at 55.
248. Divide and Multiply, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 1998, at S8.
249. James W. Skillen, Public Discourse and Electoral Representation, in CVD VOT-
ING AND DEMOCRACY REPORT, supra note 198, at 17, 19.
250. See generally James W. Skillen, Public Discourse and Electoral Representation,
in CVD VOTING AND DEMOCRACY REPORT, supra note 198, at 17, 19 (identifying the
general threshold of five percent); Arend Lijphart, Trying to Have the Best of Both
Worlds: Semi-Proportional and Mixed Systems, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM,
supra note 199, at 207, 209-11, 213 (highlighting Japan and Spain as two contemporary
national-level models of the single non-transferable vote).
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2. Concerns from Minority Voting Rights Advocates
For communities of color, certain prerequisites must be met
before minorities can gain representation under PR. First, there
must be a stable and organized base from which minority candi-
dates routinely can launch viable campaigns.2 51 This is needed in
single-member district elections as well, but because PR greatly
opens the electoral process,2 52 the re-election of minority incum-
bents is not as assured. The campaigns of incumbents of color must
be able to withstand frequent challenges from viable candidates.
Once a candidate is elected, traditional single-member district-
based elections become attractive to both the candidate and some-
times the community because of their inherent protection of in-
cumbents. 3 Under PR, winning is no longer assured and more
time may be spent on running campaigns than actually governing.
Second, the cost of running campaigns in PR elections is greater
because the voting district is relatively large. Even a candidate
who seeks support from only one slice of the electorate will still
need to campaign within a larger-sized geographic area, at a much
higher cost. Minority candidates already encounter some disability
in raising the necessary funds to mount a viable campaign. 4 With-
out public financing of their campaigns, the lack of minority repre-
sentation may not be alleviated under PR.2 55
Third, PR is designed to measure, reflect, and award representa-
tion to voters.256 Under PR, if there are large communities that do
not vote-by choice or by ineligibility-they will be frozen out of
representation. In the same way that PR facilitates the representa-
tion of voting minorities, it also aggravates the nonrepresentation
of non-voting groups. However, single-member districts, in theory,
give representation to all residents. This is because the size of the
district is determined by the total population, including non-U.S.
251. John B. Anderson, How Proportional Representative Would Open Up Politics,
in CVD VOTING AND DEMOCRACY REPORT, supra note 198, at 3, 5.
252. Hallett, supra note 214, at 113, 117; Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 227, at
1413, 1475 (footnote omitted); Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R. (Change Through
Proportional Representation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1991, 2040 (1993).
253. See Cynthia A. McKinney, A Product of the Voting Rights Act, WASH. POST,
Nov. 26, 1996, at A15 (explaining Congresswoman McKinney's re-election after her
previously-drawn majority-minority district was redrawn).
254. See Brennan Ctr for Justice supra note 124; Continuing to Build a Movement:
Legal and Grassroots Strategies, supra note 124.
255. Supra note 124 (discussing campaign finance reform).
256. C.f Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 227, at 1413, 1456 (discussing how dis-
tricting fails to represent minority interests).
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citizens, and all districts must be approximately equal in size.257
Representatives elected from districts still represent the total pop-
ulation of their districts. 25a Non-voters may not have contributed
directly to the election of the district's representative, but never-
theless they are still entitled to electoral representation and may
legitimately hold the representative accountable on issues of con-
cern.259 Thus, the last prerequisite needed before PR can deliver
on its promise of improving representation for racial and ethnic
minorities is the substantially increased voting rate of racial and
ethnic minorities.
3. Implementation of Proportional Representation
The most significant challenge confronting PR is its likelihood of
enactment. First there may be legal impediments to adopting PR.
Under the federal Constitution, PR is a legally permissible method
to elect legislative bodies.260 At the local and state level, however,
there may be constitutional and statutory prohibitions. Most state
constitutions and statutes are silent on the use of PR. A few states,
including Ohio, New York, and Massachusetts, have clearly af-
firmed and allowed its usage.26' Others, such as Michigan, Califor-
nia, and, arguably, Rhode Island, have held that PR is not
257. Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 116-17 (1971) (Douglas J., concurring); cf. Burns v.
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91-97 (1966); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 653
(1964); 1993 AALDEF SCHOOL BOARD REPORT, supra note 103, at 14 (finding mixed
results in two different communities when an Asian American was running for office);
1996 AALDEF SCHOOL BOARD REPORT, supra note 103, at 3 (stating that New York
City School Boards, which use PR, allows non-citizens with children in the public
school to vote in elections).
258. Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1971); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,
530-31 (1969) (addressing population variances in Missouri voting districts).
259. This is also true of PR voting systems, but because the unit of representation is
not geography, but rather voting patterns, the problem of lack of representation is
exacerbated under PR.
260. The Supreme Court has held that there is nothing unconstitutional about PR
elections in and of themselves. The Constitution does not compel single-member dis-
tricts. The only barrier to adopting PR for congressional elections is a 1967 federal
statute mandating that states use single member districts. Single member districts are
nothing more than a political choice, and some members of the Supreme Court al-
ready recognize that geographic districting is not a requirement inherent in the Amer-
ican political system. Thus, only a statutory change is necessary. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2
cl. 3; Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 897-98, 908-12 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Letter from Cynthia McKinney, supra note 198, at 39.
261. Joseph F. Zimmerman, The Federal Voting Rights Act and Alternative Election
Systems, 19 WM. & MARY L. REv. 621, 640, 658-59 (1978) (citing Reutener v. City of
Cleveland, 141 N.E. 27, 32 (Ohio 1923); Johnson v. City of New York, 9 N.E.2d 30
(N.Y. 1937); Moore v. Election Comm'rs of Cambridge, 35 N.E.2d 222, 231 (Mass.
1941)).
20011
780 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
permitted.262 Second, and more importantly, are pragmatic politi-
cal considerations. If seriously considered for implementation,
there would be great fear and opposition by incumbents to enact-
ing PR. Incumbents typically prefer electoral systems that pre-
serve their ability to be re-elected. As discussed previously, PR
presents serious challenges to the re-election of incumbents.
4. Overall Assessment of Proportional Representation
Concerns about PR, particularly from minority voting rights ad-
vocates, are not easily overcome. Without public financing of cam-
paigns, bilingual ballots, and improvement in the low voting rates
of Asian Americans, PR may not necessarily be that much more
superior to single-member districts in giving communities of color
representation. It is undoubtedly a more egalitarian system in that
it is designed to facilitate the representation of minority voting
constituencies, but academic and theoretical support is seldom suf-
ficient to move elected officials to abandon current electoral sys-
tems in favor of new ones.
The likelihood of PR being enacted is dismal. Notwithstanding
these drawbacks, the districting process provides an opportunity
for discussion of the merits of PR. Already, Congress has hosted a
hearing on the Voters' Choice Act, a bill which would allow states
the option of using PR to elect all or part of its congressional
delegation.263
PR might be availing in highly integrated, multi-cultural locali-
ties like Queens, New York and Boston, Massachusetts. Queens
has become tremendously diverse, both ethnically and culturally,
262. Id. at 657 (citing People v. Elkus, 211 P. 34, 36-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922); Wattles
v. Upjohn, 179 N.W. 335, 341-42 (Mich. 1920); Opinion to the Governor, 6 A.2d 147
(R.I. 1939) (advisory opinion)).
263. The Voters' Choice Act, H.R. 2545, 104th Cong. (1995). The bill allows for the
use of PR voting systems by allowing states to draw multi-member districts, provided
the method of voting is not at-large plurality, but PR. The Act reads:
[A] State that is entitled to more than one Representative in Congress may
establish a number of districts for election of Representatives that is less
than the number of Representatives to which the State is entitled, if and only
if that State uses a system of limited voting, a system of cumulative voting, or
a system of preference voting in its multi-member districts.
Id. § 2.
The bill also allows states to combine single member and multi-member districts.
Id. § 2(f). Finally, the bill cautions that "[t]he rights and remedies established by this
Act are in addition to all other rights and remedies provided by law, and the rights
and remedies established by this Act shall not supersede, restrict, or limit the applica-
tion of the Voting Rights Act of 1965." Id. at § 3; Letter from Cynthia McKinney,
supra note 198, at 39.
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with very large Latino (mostly Puerto Rican, Colombian, and Mex-
ican), Asian (Chinese, Korean, Asian Indian, Bangladeshi, Indo-
Caribbean), white (Jewish, Italian, Greek), African American, and
gay/lesbianibisexual/transgender communities.264 All are deserving
of representation. Moreover, some of these groups live in neigh-
borhoods spread throughout the borough. Since drawing voting
districts to enfranchise every one of these groups could be vulnera-
ble to challenges under Shaw,265 PR may be a viable alternative to
the complex and challenging process of redistricting in Queens.
Likewise, the Boston City Council has not been representative
of all the racial minorities of the City of Boston. PR could solve
this, and actually may even have a more viable chance of imple-
mentation in Boston than in other U.S. cities. Boston City Council
members are elected both from districts and at-large. There has
never been a person of color elected to any at-large position. Bos-
ton could maintain the at-large positions, but employ PR to elect
those members in an effort to increase the representation of people
of color.
In the end, voting from single-member districts will prevail as the
prevalent system to elect legislative bodies in the U.S. Thus, the
Asian American community must be engaged in the redistricting
efforts of 2001 to ensure the process is fair to its members. The
long-term goal is to enhance greatly the opportunity of Asian
Americans to elect candidates of their choice, as envisioned by the
Voting Rights Act. Voting rights litigators, law professors, demog-
raphers, Asian American Studies academics, and community lead-
ers must come together to blend social science research and new
findings about the Asian American community revealed in the cen-
sus with legal research on redistricting and minority representation.
Community leaders must work closely with legislators and en-
courage them to draw districts that will enfranchise Asian Ameri-
can voters.
264. NYC DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, THE NEWEST NEW YORKERS 1990-1994:
AN ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION TO NYC IN THE EARLY 1990s 86-93 (1996); NYC
DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, THE NEWEST NEW YORKERS 1995-1996: AN UPDATE OF
IMMIGRATION TO NYC IN THE MID '90s (1999).
265. This is not to say that drawing single-member districts which give meaningful
representation to each of these groups is not at all possible, nor that they would not
survive a Shaw challenge. Drawing districts on the basis of multi-cultural communities
of interest would not only give the groups meaningful representation and be defensi-
ble under Shaw and Miller. Supra Section II.B.
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CONCLUSION
The quest for greater Asian American representation requires,
first and foremost, an accurate count of Asian Americans in the
census. Past racially disparate undercounts and overcounts have
had devastating effects in the political representation of racial and
ethnic minorities. Therefore, the more accurate adjusted census
figures must be used throughout the redistricting process.
At the outset of redistricting, advocates should guard against the
dilution of minority voting strength and aim for the enfranchise-
ment of traditionally underrepresented communities. In the past, it
has been difficult for Asian Americans to draw minority-opportu-
nity districts. But the meaningful representation of Asian Ameri-
cans can still be achieved through drawing constitutionally
defensible multi-racial districts and minority-influence districts.
Further, obstacles presented in 1991 may no longer be applicable in
2001.
Increasing numbers of academics and political theorists are dis-
cussing, and sometimes promoting, the merits of alternative electo-
ral systems. Proportional representation is certainly an egalitarian
system. However, it operates best when there are already strong
underlying democratic structures, such as public financing of cam-
paigns, access to the vote through the availability of translated bal-
lots and voting instructions, and substantially increased voting rates
among people of color. Without these, PR may not be able to de-
liver the rewards of minority representation that thousands of
pages of scholarly law review articles have discussed.2 66 Never-
theless, PR deserves further examination and, perhaps,
experimentation.
In the Northeast, Asian Americans are a rapidly growing seg-
ment of the polity. A movement toward Asian American voting
rights aims to secure the meaningful representation of Asian
Americans. Meaningful representation can restore the legitimacy
of the government in the views of those governed.2 67 The ultimate
goal is both expansive and simplistic-to realize our nation's
founding principles, to wit, democracy.
266. See supra note 198 for a sampling of articles.
267. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Governments...
deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed."); A. Leon Higginbotham
Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating Racial Conse-
quences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1637-38 (1994).
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